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1.0. Introduction 
Environmental issues are increasingly on the international agenda. The rising 
awareness of problems created by global environmental degradation has been spurred 
by, amongst other things, the introduction of the concept of sustainable development 
by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(IUCN) in 1980, and gaining currency with the Brundtland report of 1987. Numerous 
scholars have, without reaching consensus on the issue, suggested or denied 
connections, between the fight for access to natural resources and the rise of tension 
and conflict (Hauge & Ellingsen 2001: 37). Relating environment and conflict, seems 
to be of growing interest. Many theoretical assumptions have been made about the 
relationship between environmental degradation and conflict; however, few empirical 
studies on the topic have given significant support to these suppositions. Quantitative 
large-N studies in particular, struggle to find strong connections between violent 
internal conflict and renewable resource scarcity (Urdal 2005; Theisen 2006). An 
important aspect of the environmental context is population, and migration is a crucial 
part of this.  
 
Migration has been connected both to conflict and the environment mainly by the 
much-debated concept of “environmental refugees”. Myers‟ predictions of a displaced 
population of at least 200 million people due to environmental strains have had great 
influence on the debate concerning such refugees. He has identified an emergent 
problem that, if correct, necessarily is of great significance (1997: 168). It is 
speculated that this phenomenon represents one of the potentially greatest human 
crises of our time, and that it is an “outward manifestation of profound change – a 
manifestation often marked by extreme deprivation, fear and despair” (Myers 1997: 
181). The most widely repeated predictions of 200 million refugees are, however, 
contested, and the repetition in itself does not make the figure any more accurate 
(Brown 2007: 2). These refugees are claimed to be displaced because of environmental 
causes, whether abrupt or more subtle, but all due to environmental change. 
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Categorizing these people as such is in itself problematic, and may be misleading. 
Estimates of their number vary, as do their definition. Environmental change has 
always been a natural part of human adaptation to such change, and still is, a necessity. 
As a way of adjusting to these changes, people have historically migrated over smaller 
or larger areas to improve their predicaments. Although the consequences of 
environmental change might have accelerated, it is difficult to compare expected 
consequences to the extraordinary. Some downplay the urgency of the migration 
problematic by claiming that the migration effects of environmental distress may be 
absorbed by the urbanization trend. Such evolvement may, however, in turn pose even 
larger challenges to potential local conflict levels.  
 
Population displacement due to environmental degradation and change is an issue, but 
so is the impact of population growth on the environment, due to its potentially violent 
consequences. There are, however, conflicting views on the magnitude of population 
growth, and the projections vary accordingly. Recent history has arguably rejected the 
most extreme predictions, and there are even those who claim that the population 
growth is so much in decline that one claim to have “turned a corner on population 
growth” (Goldstone 2001: 96). The reasons for this may be an increase in education 
for women, the spread of economic development, and /or national and international 
support for policies of population planning (and accompanying movement along the 
demographic transition), which in turn has contributed to dropping fertility and 
population growth rates in different parts of the world. There is, however, no denying 
a considerable overall population increase. Considering moderate estimates of a rise to 
9 billion people by 2050, and assuming international migration to remain at no more 
than a 3% of the world‟s population, migration would increase to approximately 275 
million in 2050. This growth is expected to be unevenly distributed, with less 
developed regions being particularly affected. Estimates suppose a global doubling of 
the age group 15-24, which traditionally are those most prone to migrate (Black et al. 
2008). The consequences of population growth and the additional population pressure 
of migration is an obvious challenge. It will be crucial to establish an understanding of 
possible consequences of such likely future scenarios, particularly in a resource scarce 
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context. Weiner and Teitelbaum argue that “Population – its growth or decline, its 
movement, its density, its characteristics, its distribution – has always been linked to 
questions of security.” This entails that the movement of peoples has transformed 
societies, and both made and unmade states. In addition, population growth has been 
regarded a source of national power, or alternately been a contributor to disorder and 
violence. Contemplation following this same logic has grasped the attention of ancient 
and classical political philosophers and commentators (2001: ix). Environmental issues 
have also been incorporated into security thinking, and have at times been labelled 
“the new security issue”. This perspective is clarified by the reasoning of Myers:  
 
If a nation’s environmental foundations are depleted, its economy will steadily 
decline, its social fabric deteriorate, and its political structure become 
destabilized. The outcome is all too likely to be conflict, whether conflict in the 
form of disorder and insurrection within the nation, or tensions and hostilities 
with other nations (Myers 1986: 251). 
 
Threats to security are thus being more broadly defined today than in the past. 
Environmental security is an unconventional source of threat, though the threat of 
conflict remains a conventional concern. Homer-Dixon provoked great concern and 
controversy when claiming that we are on the verge of an era where environmental 
change will more frequently trigger conflict, if not be the primary source of insecurity 
(Goldstone 2001: 84-88). Despite the consequential security thinking, Homer-Dixon 
himself argues that the environment-security theme incorporates an almost 
unmanageable range of sub-issues, especially if the security term is broadly defined. 
He recommends a narrowing down of the research question to primarily investigating 
conflict rather than security, however still claiming the topic being too vast (1991: 76-
77). Even though armed conflict in the world today is at a historic low, and that there 
has been a decline in conflict throughout the post-war era, recent years show an 
escalation in armed conflict world wide. This recent increase is suggested due to 
intrastate rather, than interstate conflict (Eriksson & Wallensteen 2004: 625). Several 
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scholars agree that our understanding of the potential security risk that is posed by 
environmental degradation is increasingly complex and are marked by a pattern of 
conflicts within countries, rather than interstate conflicts (Ohlsson1999; Deudney 
1990; Homer-Dixon 1999). Ohlsson argues that in the wake of the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994, the Director of USAID, Brian Atwood, noting that issues of natural 
resources are frequently critical to achieving political and economic stability, while 
also identifying disintegrated societies and failed states as the greatest menace to 
global stability, took the first step of identifying the new pattern of conflicts in the 
world (Ohlsson 1999: 26). 
 
Identifying environmental degradation as a security issue is in its own right no given. 
Not all scholars agree that this status is well earned. Barnett argues that environmental 
change and its impact on social and ecological systems, together with a post cold war 
fluid international security environment, encourages environmental degradations to be 
viewed as a security concern (2001: 2). Although emphasising interstate conflict, 
Deudney admits that given the trend of deteriorating environment as a consequence of 
the accelerating race toward higher standards of living, environmental issues are likely 
to “become an increasingly important dimension of political life at all levels” (1990: 
461). However, he severely doubts the link between environmental degradation and 
national security. Deudney claims that this upgrade to a national security concern is 
owed primarily to the traditional focus on national security, and it being a main feature 
when it comes to both intrastate and interstate conflict (1990: 461). Suhrke has an 
almost normative approach to the question of environmental security. When referring 
to the history of migration, she argues that migrants and refugees may represent 
victims, assets, or threats. By selecting the most negative dimension  “the security 
paradigm is likely to reinforce popular stereotypes of migrants as undesirable and 
dangerous, even if the analyst does not draw this conclusion” (1997: 256, see also 
Weiner 1993; 1995). This does not render the security paradigm obsolete in this 
context, but requires that it is treated with caution, particularly when it comes to the 
suitability to empirical material (Suhrke 1997: 256).  
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This Master‟s thesis starts from the neo-Malthusian assumption that demographic 
change (mainly population growth) and resource scarcity, are important sources of 
armed conflict. Demographic factors have arguably been linked to conflict from time 
immemorial. Demographic aggression is thus by no means a new concept, although 
demographic variables and forms of demographic aggression vary over time and place 
(Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001: 46). In this thesis, the main demographic variable of 
interest is migration pressure, operationalized as refugees, and the context is that of 
resource scarcity. Measuring migration pressure through refugees captures sudden 
increases in population relative to the access of renewable resources in a better way 
than by looking at general population density or growth. The supposition is that sharp 
increases in competition over resources caused by sudden increase in migration will 
place heavy burdens on the physical environment.  
 
The forms of aggression studied are both low and high intensity conflicts, and include 
non-state and state actors. A broadened definition of conflict avoids a limitation to 
conventional conflict, and provides a broader test of the neo-Malthusian argument. 
There are theoretical reasons for assuming increased occurrence of minor rather than 
major conflicts as a result of environmental factors (Homer-Dixon 1995: 12)
1
. It can 
also be argued that the most likely type of conflict to emerge is one internal to 
countries. This entails that the supposed intensity of a conflict can be lower both due to 
an expectation that the actors involved are less organized and equipped than those in 
conventional conflicts, and that the context of the conflict, suffering from scarcity of 
important resources, possibly represents strain on conflict activity in its own right
2
. 
This is accounted for in this thesis by defining conflict at a low intensity level (25 
                                                 
1
 Homer-Dixon and Blitt investigates both state- and non-state conflict, but does not 
noteworthy distinguish between the two. In the publication “Ecoviolence” the conventional 
conflicts in Gaza, Chappas and Rwanda are investigated, as are the non-state conflicts of 
Pakistan and South Africa (1998).  
 
2
 The indirect mortality rate can nonetheless be quite high under these circumstances. Conflict 
in an already precarious environmental context can have fatal consequences for civilians and 
combatants alike (e.g. Darfur).  
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battle-related deaths per year) than what is commonly used in civil-war studies (1000 
battle deaths), and by including non-conventional conflict, where the state is not an 
active party to the conflict. The study will take the form of a large-N quantitative 
cross-national time-series study, covering the period 1950-2007. The unit of analysis is 
the country-year. The dependent variable is armed conflict onset. Migration pressure, 
renewable resource scarcity and international presence, are all central independent 
variables. The main focus is thus; the effects of migration on conflict in a resource 
scarce context. The causal relationship between migration and scarcity is assumed to 
have a mutually reinforcing positive effect on the outbreak of conflict. This study is 
restricted to domestic conflict, and does not consider interstate conflict. International 
aid is expected to have a mediating, or at least negative effect on this relationship. The 
focal point of the thesis is reflected in the following general hypothesis, later to be 
specified in two sub-hypotheses: 
 
Migration pressure has a greater impact on the probability of conflict the greater 
the level of renewable resource scarcity. 
 
The interaction of migration and resource scarcity in potentially causing conflict, have 
so far not been thoroughly investigated, leaving room for the contribution of this 
Master‟s Thesis. The focus on migration pressure where resources are scarce, and its 
implications on the risk of conflict, is an interesting topic. Migration, as well as 
resource scarcity, is by many understood as increasing, and it is important to explore 
whether the conjunction of these two phenomena is likely to spur conflict. To 
investigate these possible connections, the analysis will as mentioned use a 
quantitative design. Although few large-N studies find strong relationships between 
renewable resource scarcity and internal conflict, this thesis may be justified both by 
the alternative causal connections it investigates, and by the use of relatively new and 
diverse data, particularly considering the inclusion of low-intensity and non-state 
conflict.  
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2.0. Theory 
„Environmental refugees‟ seem to be naturally associated with the subject of 
environmental degradation and migration. This concept has become progressively 
noticeable, and the term continues to gain way both in the contemporary climate-
debate and among scholars. The estimated number of environmental refugees is 
disputed, as are the definitions of who exactly qualifies to constitute this population. 
Estimating the magnitude of environmental migration is almost impossible, or difficult 
at best (Suhrke 1993: 33). The definitional boundaries of refugee-generating 
environmental changes have varied, ranging from “sudden natural disasters to gradual 
natural disasters to human-induced disasters.” (Lee 2001: 55) Although there seems to 
be little doubt that environmental disruption contributes to large population 
displacement, how to determine its scale with certainty remains a challenge (Lee 2001: 
55-58). There is an admission of the fact there is no “mono-causal relationship 
between climate change, disasters and displacement” (NRC 2009: 5). Although, it is 
recognized that there does exists a link between the phenomena. The distinction 
between involuntary and voluntary migration is controversial, yet essential (Suhrke 
1991: 9). This distinction is used to contrast environmental refugees from migrants. 
Where environmental refugees respond to push factors, migrants act based on a 
combination of pull and push factors. Refugees, thereby, flee relatively unprepared 
compared to migrants (Suhrke 1991: 9-10). While voluntary migration is an obvious 
adaptation strategy, climate change and disasters may also cause forced displacement 
that is essential for survival (NRC 2009: 5). United Nations Development Programme 
(UNEP) researcher El-Hinnawi first defined environmental refugees as: 
 
[…] those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, 
temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption 
(natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or 
seriously affected the quality of their life [sic]. By ‘environmental disruption’ in 
this definition is meant any physical, chemical, and/or biological changes in the 
8 
 
ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, 
unsuitable to support human life. (El-Hinnawi 1985: 4). 
 
Environmental changes may lead to different kinds of migration, depending on the 
characteristics of these changes, and resulting in acute versus slow onset of 
environmentally induced migration (Zolberg and Benda 2001). The urgency of 
migration due to extreme weather may lead to more temporary displacement than 
displacements provoked by slower processes, such as rising sea levels. State capacity 
may influence the mere scale of the migration, as well as possibilities for repatriation. 
Bear in mind that when discussing refugees in this study, these are categorized as such 
in the more traditional sense of the word. 
 
 
2.1. Scarcity and conflict 
Many theoretical arguments derive from the original work of Thomas Malthus, and 
connect population pressure to conflict. This postulates the simple, but profound, 
notion that while food production grows linearly, population increases tends to be 
exponential (Tir & Diehl 2001: 61). “All of us who ponder the questions of the human 
environment are the intellectual descendants of Thomas Robert Malthus”, no matter if 
one should agree on his teachings or not (Kates 1996: 45). The theoretical framework 
of this thesis will explore the neo-Malthusian presumption of the unsustainability of 
food-production and population growth. Contemporary understanding of population 
and resource issues can be said to derive from three principal dimensions of concern: 
Malthusian, Marxist and Ecological. Malthus assumed that the number of people 
would grow at a geometric rate
3
, thereby overwhelming the resources that are 
                                                 
3  “Geometric growth refers to the situation where successive changes in a population differ 
by a constant ratio (OECD)” [Emphasis added]. 
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expanding only at an arithmetic rate
4
. Continuations of this demographic pessimism 
are the Marxists. Although refuting the Malthusian premise, this view defines the 
population problem in terms of distribution. It is argued that existing resources will be 
sufficient, if only they are properly utilized and distributed. This will be achieved 
through a transformation from capitalism to socialism. The Ecologists brought forth 
the implications of ecological factors on the political and economic failure or success 
of a nation. Meadows and Meadows’ book The Limits to Growth (1972) was a 
benchmark in this regard. This perspective challenges the inevitability of continued 
industrialization, from where most ecological pressure stems (Lee 2001: 8-9). Political 
ecologists consider resource-related conflicts to be primarily motivated by structural 
inequalities, rather than “natural” scarcities and population growth (Kahl 2006: 23).  
 
Environmental depletion is assumed to further hurry these incompatible developments. 
Many environmental scarcity models widely rely on the assumptions of relative 
deprivation theory. This implies that renewable resource scarcity will encourage socio-
economic grievances that eventually result in conflict (Theisen 2008: 814-815).  This 
is further specified by Ohlsson, who defines the general understanding of the 
Malthusian dilemma as: 
 
[...] great and global processes of change that follow from continuing large 
population increases, rising developmental expectations, the unavoidable 
environmental impacts that follow as these expectations gradually are realized, 
and the consequences, in turn, for people as their societies are put to such 
severe strains resulting from these large processes of change that their very 
ability to fulfil the undeniable right to better lives for their populations is 
threatened, ultimately entailing risk of violent conflict (Ohlsson 1999: 3).  
 
The works of Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Group are placed within the relative 
deprivation tradition in conflict theory. The core concept of Homer-Dixon‟s work is 
                                                 
4  Distinct from the concept above. Increase by a constant number (OECD).  
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environmental scarcity, distinguished by three dimensions. The supply-induced 
scarcity dimension implies that the availability of a renewable resource is reduced 
faster than its regeneration. Demand-induced scarcity results from growth in 
population or increase in per capita consumption. Structural scarcity occurs where 
resources are inequitably distributed and rest in possession of a privileged minority, 
while the remaining population suffers from resource shortage (Homer-Dixon 1994). 
Environmental scarcity is a product of these parts working in conjunction. The 
Toronto Group emphasises that any treatment the fundamental issue of resource 
renewable resource scarcity should “encompass the exhaustive set of scarcity‟s 
resources: decreases in supply, increases in demand and changes in distribution 
(Schwartz, Deligiannis and Homer-Dixon 2001. 276).” These different categories of 
scarcity interact and are mutually reinforcing, resulting in two social processes 
designated „resource capture‟ and „ecological marginalization‟. The latter occurs when 
population groups faced with resource scarcity migrate into areas with fragile eco-
systems, which in turn generates greater scarcities in the given area as well as 
deprivation conflicts between locals and newcomers (Homer-Dixon 1999). Concerning 
„resource capture‟, there is arguably a social inequality effect caused by society‟s 
powerful, resulting in ecological marginalization of the less advantaged (Ohlsson 
1999: 38). 
  
None of these theoretical assumptions, however, go unchallenged. The Malthusian 
analysis has been somewhat discredited mainly as a consequence of remarkable 
augmentation in food production and our capacity to both exploit and transform our 
environment (Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001: ix). Julian Simon represents one of the 
leading advocates of the school of thought that does not consider population increase 
to be as dangerous. By this he challenges the basic assumption that population growth 
inevitably leads to resource scarcity. The argument is that most resources are not 
genuinely fixed in the economic sense, and are therefore not likely to diminish due to 
rising population. Resources are valuable only for the „services‟ they provide. Because 
the resources we exploit are perpetually changing, resources are not finite. The 
ultimate scarce resource is claimed to be human ingenuity (1981; 1996). There are 
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nevertheless difficulties concerning this “optimist” view. First of all, it largely discards 
the lag-time between population pressure and necessary technological adjustments, 
and the fact that these will vary across countries and regions. Secondly, technological 
innovation is both unequally distributed and accessible in time and space. Finally, the 
assumption that technological advancement will be the salvation to population growth 
is argued to be “neither sufficiently justified theoretically nor entirely confirmed 
empirically” (Tir & Diehl 2001: 65-66).  
 
Political economy as a field, including the views of Malthus, has been accused of 
tending to “reduce everything to social construction, blatantly disregarding all that is 
not human” (Greenberg & Park 1994: 1). Political ecologists generally claim to 
consider both cultural and political activity within an analysis of ecosystems, 
considered to be significantly, yet not entirely social constructs. For political 
ecologists „the environment‟ ranges from the predominantly cultural, through the 
intensely political to the considerably natural (ibid: 8). Peluso and Watts reject 
automatic and oversimplified linkages between increased environmental scarcity, 
decreased economic activity, migration, and the resulting violence and conflict that 
Homer-Dixon and his colleagues (the Toronto group) are accused of. They consider 
violence to be the product of local histories and social relations, while still very much 
being part of larger processes of power relations and material transformation. The 
importance of patterns of accumulation is emphasised. These patterns are formed by a 
structured political economy, which differentiates positions of, and access to, 
resources (Peluso & Watts 2001: 5). Peluso and Watts refuse scarcity to have 
monopoly over violence, which they consider a claim of Homer-Dixon‟s. Both 
resource scarcity and abundance alike can provoke violence. They call for more 
thorough investigation of the ways in which environmental violence disguises and 
reflects other forms of social struggle (ibid: 5-8). Political ecology generally argues 
that environmental issues become „socialized‟ when collective resources are controlled 
by local groups at the expense of others. This again forces management interventions 
by private firms, state agents or development authorities. By the same logic, conflicts 
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within and between communities are „ecologized‟ by conservation or resource 
development policies (Robbins 2004: 14). Elements of environmental issues are 
increasingly present, but hidden by the perpetrators and observers of violence equally. 
The legacy of Malthus and the like is considered more of a curse than anything. Peluso 
and Watts understand the predictions and causalities behind environmental scarcity 
and conflict as provoked by a “deep fear of the poor and their claims to resources, 
despite radical changes in the world since Malthus‟ time (Peluso & Watts 2001: 5-8).  
 
Studies conducted by Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Group, have been under heavy 
scrutiny (Gleditsch & Urdal 2002; Gleditsch 1998). It is claimed that when these 
investigate the relationships between environment and conflict, there is little or no 
variation in neither the dependent nor the independent variable. This is because the 
literature is mainly based on case studies, where both stress on the environment and 
armed conflict are or have been present. This makes generalizations difficult (Hauge 
and Ellingsen 2001: 37-40). Some argue that most empirical findings from 
environment-conflict case analyses acknowledge an interaction and mutual stimulation 
of conflict and environment, and thereby conclude that little, if any, conflict can be 
strictly defined as environmental conflict (Lee 2001). Another problem is that the 
concept of environmental scarcity in itself is based on other factors than environmental 
degradation. The idea of structural scarcity, for instance, is concerned with the unequal 
distribution of resources and is in large part a product of politics. The politics of 
distribution is accused of disappearing in the overarching environmental scarcity 
concept (Hauge and Ellingsen 2001: 37-40). 
  
Appreciating the complexity of the environment-conflict nexus, Homer-Dixon restricts 
his research ambitions. Rather than evaluating the whole spectre of independent 
variables, he weighs the seriousness of the processes or pathways whereby the 
environment may affect the degree of dependent variables. Despite these precautions, 
Lee states that while the environment is merely one of many causally significant 
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factors in the complex conditions of conflict, it is still reasonable to claim that “with 
intensifying environmental decline, violent conflict involving environmental 
components has been noticeably increasing” (2001: 5-6). The Toronto group in 
general, is accused of failing to contribute to the understanding of the causal pathway 
to domestic armed conflict by ignoring more direct linkages between these conflicts, 
and political and economic factors. Gleditsch‟s (1998) critique of Homer-Dixon and 
the Toronto group is mainly rooted in methodological concerns, such as inappropriate 
selection of cases, the neglect of the possibility for reverse causation, devising 
untestable models, lacking tools to weigh causal variables and overemphasising the 
complexity of ecological-political systems. This critique to Homer-Dixon represent a 
“methodological straightjacket that would, if widely adopted, severely constrain 
research in the field” (Schwartz, Deligiannis and Homer-Dixon 2001: 273-274). It is 
further argued that these deep methodological issues “can only be understood in the 
context of Gleditsch‟s unduly narrow perspective on what constitutes systematic 
research (Schwartz, Deligiannis & Homer-Dixon 2001: 280)”. Homer-Dixon and 
colleagues defend their methodology by emphasizing the difference between causal 
effect and causal mechanism. Neither the single-case nor experimental and quasi-
experimental method is sufficient in revealing any causation with absolute certainty. 
The single-case method is even so a necessary instrument to demonstrate causation 
(Schwartz, Deligiannis & Homer-Dixon 2001: 282). 
 
More fundamentally, the relative importance of renewable resource scarcity and 
depletion remains debated (Theisen 2006: 5). The focus on the degradation of 
renewable resources is, on a theoretical level, reinforced by the concept of the “tragedy 
of the commons”. This illustrates a mechanism whereby natural resources, not yet 
subjected to social management or regulation, apparently inevitably are depleted due 
to an increase in demand, particularly from population growth. This tragedy occurs 
mainly in periods of rapid change, when social systems‟ capacity to adapt has proven 
insufficient, or when regimes of resource management have been challenged by 
competing modes of production (Ohlsson 1999: 18). Gurr even argues that scarcity 
14 
 
seldom is an objective fact, but rather is a social construct shaped by people‟s 
perception, given that scarcity rarely exists as an absolute fact. “Scarcity as a social or 
political problem is largely defined by people‟s perception of the lack of a resource in 
terms of their image of the good life” (Welch & Miewald 1983: 10). However, Gurr 
argues that ecological scarcity could breed gradual impoverishment, creating material 
inequalities both within and among societies. These inequalities are, in turn, claimed to 
intensify class cleavages, ethnic hostilities and conflicts (1985). Defining scarcity like 
this diverts somewhat from the more commonly used economic conception of resource 
scarcity (Gurr 1985: 55). Ohlsson also stresses the relative nature of 'scarcity'. 
Although a seemingly straightforward concept, indicating “a situation where there is 
insufficient amount of a particular resource or asset to satisfy normal requirements”. 
Determining what is 'normal' and how that norm has evolved, however, is highly 
problematic. Considering the concept of scarcity as a social construct, and to 
acknowledge it as such, is to “recognize the impact of cultural change on material 
needs” (1999: 3-4). 
 
The very urgency of resource depletion problematic is scrutinized by the notion of 
human abilities of adaptation. Ingenuity is important in order to be able to handle 
resource scarcity and environmental degradation successfully. The ongoing debates 
present diverting opinions on what may inspire the necessary creativity. Boserup 
(1965) argues that in agriculturally dependent societies, the mere pressure on resources 
will necessarily lead to both innovation and economic diversification. de Soysa further 
reasons that the abundance of resources (be that non-renewable or renewable) 
obstructs incentives for innovation. This is because states become less dependent upon 
skilled labour by collecting the majority of its revenues from resource rents, and 
thereby under-develop human capital, considered to be the most important determinant 
for economic growth (de Soysa 2002, 2005). As a result of ever increasing resource 
consumption, population growth and resource access, resource substitution and 
conservation tasks will become ever more urgent, significantly increasing the need for 
ingenuity (Homer-Dixon 1999: 26). Societies need to adapt by ingenuity, and both 
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understand and act on links between environmental scarcity and violence, and its 
negative social effects (Homer-Dixon 1999: 107). With necessity being the mother of 
all invention, there will be an assumed increase in ingenuity that will help alleviate 
scarcity‟s severity and social impacts (Homer-Dixon 1999: 108).  
 
Homer-Dixon admits that the answers concerning what affects a society‟s ability to 
supply much needed ingenuity, is highly complex. Ingenuity is relative to many 
factors, such as social, political, economic and cultural characteristics of the different 
countries, and these respond to scarcity in different ways. Homer-Dixon claims that 
with a rise in both population and per capita resource consumption, in addition to 
persistent inequalities in resource access; renewable resource scarcity will affect 
especially poor countries with “unprecedented severity, speed and scale” (Homer-
Dixon 1999: 26). This need is however challenged by influences and circumstances 
such as limited access to capital, brain drain, incompetent bureaucracies, generally 
weak states and corrupt judicial systems. In addition, the supply of ingenuity can be 
limited by stresses generated by the very resource insufficiency it envisioned to solve. 
There is said to be an “ingenuity gap” where the “requirement for ingenuity to deal 
with environmental scarcity rises while their supply of ingenuity stagnates or drops” 
(Homer-Dixon 1999: 26-27).  
 
The argument continues that in poorly governed countries, and especially those with a 
history of conflict, there is also a lack of incentives to invest both time and labour in 
the conservation of resources. Combined with low government interest and investment 
in rural areas, bad governance is held to be the causal mechanism behind both resource 
degradation and civil war (de Soysa 2002, 2005). Other scholars also emphasize 
government resources and the quality of institutions as key determinants of whether or 
not increasing scarcity will lead to conflict (Kahl 2006). Raleigh and Urdal argue that 
compared to all economic, political and social factors, environmental and demographic 
stress is not likely to be an equally important risk factor. The first mentioned factors 
are considered to not only determine the state capacity to adapt, but also largely mould 
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the general opportunities for rebel groups to succeed (2007: 676).  
 
Gleditsch argues that politics have a mediating effect on the environment and conflict 
relationship
5. Everything else being equal, democracies have a more “enlightened 
environmental behaviour”. Democracies are claimed to be more responsive to those 
affected by environmental degradation, and are also more prone to actively cooperate 
internationally in order to alleviate environmental problems (2001: 57). The 
importance of state capacity is stressed to be a determinant of the impact of migration. 
Kahl recognises two causal pathways from demographic and environmental stress, 
understood as resource scarcity, and violent conflict
6
. These causal arguments are 
„state-centric‟, and form the hypothesis of state exploitation and state failure. The 
latter meaning a weakening of the state. This in turn heightens the potential gain from 
a rebellion compared to the likely costs a state is able to inflict on the rebels, and 
thereby an increase risk of conflict is to be expected (ibid 2006: 47). Demographic and 
environmental stress may negatively interfere with a state‟s functional capacity by 
costly demands placed to remedy strains on the agricultural sector, and needs for social 
improvements (Kahl 2006: 40-43).  
 
State capacity may be considered a reflection of its vulnerability. Vulnerability is by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defined as “the degree, to 
which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate 
change, including climate viability and extremes” (2001: 995). This concept thereby 
captures both the risk and degree of exposure, as well as the ability to handle the 
                                                 
5
 Gleditsch also claims that politics influence the very manner in which conflicts are acted 
out. This reasoning stems from the concept of democratic peace (See: Gleditsch & Hegre 
1997; Raknerud & Hegre 1997). This concept is however considered to lie outside the scope 
of this Thesis. 
 
6
 Armed conflict is throughout this thesis defined with a lower threshold of 25 annual battle-
deaths, as used in the Uppsala dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; datasets available at 
http://www.prio.no/cwp/datasets). 
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challenges imposed by the environment. Social cohesion may be put to the test by 
diverting understandings of the best response to challenges of resource scarcity, put 
forward by competing parties. An undermining of overall economic activity may 
generally contribute negatively to both a states functional capacity and its abilities of 
social cohesion (Kahl 2006: 40-43). Even when demographic and environmental 
factors are not the drivers behind state failure, such factors contribute to a relative 
weakening of the state and these are considered more perceptible to conflict over 
resource scarcity. This increased risk of conflict is both due to the states inability to 
mitigate effects of resource scarcity, and because they are overall more likely to be 
militarily challenged by opposition groups (Raleigh & Urdal 2007: 679). While large 
migrations stem from environmental problems, a future migration crisis is equally a 
crisis of social, political and economic sorts, that mirrors institutional systems‟ 
inabilities to effectively reflect unique and deep-seated changes, such as this (Myers 
1997: 181). 
 
Homer-Dixon does in fact acknowledge the importance of context. Environmental 
scarcity is never a sole or sufficient cause of violence, poverty or large migrations. 
Environmental scarcity is assumed to always interact with other economic, political 
and social factors to produce the social effects described above (Homer-Dixon 1999: 
16). This implies that for conflict to break out as a result of environmental factors, it 
takes more than solely environmental degradation, or resource scarcity. The adaptive 
capacity of the state in particular and society in general, is crucial (Ohlsson 1999: 48). 
Given an environmental issue, however, “there must be both an opportunity and a 
clearly perceived advantage of taking to arms” (ibid: 48). As claimed by Homer-
Dixon, countries experiencing rapid growth in population are dependent on adaptation 
to be able to avoid conflict in comparison to countries with a high but stable 
population-to-resource ratio (Homer-Dixon 1999). Moreover, Homer-Dixon explicitly 
emphasises the heightened possibility for conflict outbreak within, rather than between 
states. “These environmental scarcities do not cause wars among countries, but they 
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can generate severe social stresses within countries, helping to stimulate sub national 
insurgencies, ethnic clashes, and urban unrests” (Homer-Dixon 1999: 12). 
 
Hauge and Ellingsen have found that economic and political factors are the strongest 
predictors of conflict, but that environmental and demographic factors nonetheless 
have impact (1998). Kahl addresses this by arguing that by way of economic, 
ecological and social effects, population and environmental pressure reverberate into 
politics that by state failure and state exploitation, turn into pathways to civil strife 
(2006: 29-30). The state may instigate conflict in their advantage by focusing on 
migrants. Rejecting the migrant population may be used in order to gain popularity and 
support from the domestic population. Suhrke argues that this role may be reversed by 
the state aligning itself with the displaced. Such scenarios are considered more likely 
in situations where the support of a displaced group is determined on grounds of ethnic 
politics or economics (Suhrke 1993: 28). This underlines the alleged critical 
relationship between “the migrant, the refugee and the state”. The potential for acute 
conflict thereby lies in the migrant population‟s ability to gain support and make 
demands (Suhrke 1997: 270).  
 
In a quite opposite scenario, and in the absence of state intervention, refugees 
generated and driven by environmental pressures tend to be victims, rather than 
threats. These migrants are weakened, disempowered and dispersed, and pose no 
immediate threat. They are claimed to make few effective demands on the receiving 
area, and their most urgent needs are commonly met by international relief. Social 
exploitation, rather than blatant social conflict, takes place (Suhrke 1997: 270). 
Raleigh and Urdal emphasise difficulties in testing the opportunity aspect of a state 
exploitation. As derived from Kahl‟s (2006) concepts of such a potential role of a 
state, one can imagine a state instrumentally using resource scarcity as a means to 
bolster support. Encouraging (e.g. inter-ethnic) conflict over resources, may contribute 
to divert attention from state incapability of meeting domestic demands. Though 
theoretically appealing, Raleigh and Urdal argue that the hypothesis is too vaguely 
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defined to be able to isolate effects and test by statistical analysis (2007: 679-680). 
Homer-Dixon is also aware that environmental degradation in itself is an insufficient 
cause of violence, recognizing the importance of economic, political and social factors. 
He is, however, concerned that scholars may “swing to the opposite extreme” of what 
he himself been accused for, namely underestimating important contextual factors. 
First of all, environmental scarcity can itself affect social factors like institutions and 
policies in harmful ways, and not only the other way around. Secondly, mere physical 
characteristics of the society‟s surrounding environment can be a factor. Lastly, once 
environmental scarcity becomes irreversible, it is as if by definition, an external 
influence on society (Homer-Dixon 1999: 17). 
  
 
2.2. Migration and Resource Scarcity 
Migration has naturally always existed, but scholars seem to agree that there, for 
different and controversial reasons, has been an increase at least in forced migration, 
across and within international border (Wood 1994; Castles & Miller 2005). Millions 
of migrants and refugees, and their hopes for freedom from violence and repression are 
coincidently matched by the fears of states and their citizens, that a massive influx of 
newcomers will impose strains on the economy, upset a possible precarious ethnic 
balance, weaken national identity or threaten political upheaval (Weiner and 
Teitelbaum 2001: 107-108). Whether or not these governmental concerns are 
justifiable is difficult to assess, although perhaps not from the lack of trying. 
Comprehensive and generalisible theories are considered to remain elusive. Linkages 
between demography and security, and their predictive implications, have been linked 
to theory, but intervening variables between causes and consequences, highly 
contextual outcomes and data limitations, are accused of confounding empirical 
analysis (Weiner and Russell 2001: 16).  
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Cause and effect relationships between environmental degradation and migration are 
difficult to quantify, and are considered tied to political, cultural and economic factors 
(Zolberg and Benda 2001: 44). Migration may be both a cause and effect of worsening 
environmental conditions. There may be overlapping environmental, economic and 
political push factors, as well as pull factors in the receiving area determining whether, 
when and where to move (Buhaug et al: 2008: 21). Although the causes of migration 
are not pivotal to this particular study, the points made are nevertheless useful. 
Reasons to flee can be many. Traditionally, as acknowledged by the United Nations, 
refugees are those who migrate in fear of being persecuted because of “race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (UNHCR 
1951: Article 1)”. This definition assumes across-border migration, as does the 
operationalization of migration pressure in this Thesis‟ analysis. The widely accepted 
definition of a refugee, is thereby someone fleeing from war or conflict, having 
crossed an internationally acknowledged border and usually granted political asylum. 
Distinguishing a refugee from a voluntary migrant is imperative. 
It is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive original 
motivations to settle elsewhere, which characterises all refugee decisions and 
distinguishes the refugee from the voluntary migrant (Kunz1973: 130 in Hugo 
1996: 109). 
There are two different forms of migration that are considered somewhat intertwined. 
Voluntary migration is motivated by several influences derived from economic, 
political and ideological reasoning, but also considering environmental factors. Forced 
migration may stem from direct environmental factors that create unbearable living 
conditions, but this degradation may in its own turn be a product of underlying 
economic and political factors. Following this same logic, Unruh, Krol and Kliot more 
precisely define that migration triggered from conflict caused by resource depletion, 
“does not occur because of the direct consequence of environmental change but rather 
as a result of a complex series of interlinked (“snowballing”) factors in which single 
clear-cut cause-to-effect relations may not be identifiable” (2004: VIII). In such a 
perspective, the distinction between economic and environmental refugees is not 
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straightforward. Further blurring these particular motivations is the notion of eco-
migrants; “eco” stemming from both the term ecology and that of economy. Eco-
migrant is an even more indistinct concept than the “environmental refugee”. Eco-
migrants include those voluntarily moving to new areas in order to exploit natural 
resources. However, these same people are often forced to leave, as resources on 
which they depend are severely degraded or destroyed (Zolberg and Benda 2001: 47). 
 
Many scholars have attempted to nuance migration. Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 
differentiate between rapid and gradual, and permanent or temporary migration. These 
differentiations are influenced by the speed of the perceived environmental pull and 
push factors. A further distinction is made by identifying those who flee from 
immediate dangers, and separate from those who travel over longer distances with 
hopes of a better future in a different area (2008: 27). When discussing complex issues 
of what can lead to migration of populations, Unruh, Krol and Kliot claim an 
important distinction between voluntary and forced migration (2004: VIII).  Olson 
added the dimension of physical danger, which is environmentally induced, to the 
established premise of persecution. He defines refugees, and thereby forced migration, 
as follows:  
 
Refugees differ from other, spontaneous or sponsored migrants, largely in the 
circumstances of their movement out of one area to another, and the effects 
these have on them in the settlement and adjustment phases of their relocation. 
Refugees are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their 
environment which makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it. 
They are coerced by an external force to leave their homes and go elsewhere 
(1979: 130 in Hugo 1996: 107). 
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Salehyan also differentiates types of migration, distinguishing between environmental 
migrants and „classic‟ refugees. It is claimed that environmental refugees do not have 
political agendas, unlike refugees that flee from conflict zones and that are inclined to 
make political demands and have an interest in the conflict outcome of their native 
countries. If environmental degradation leads to conflict and thereby forces migration, 
then these refugees are assumed to have a greater propensity to provoke conflict in the 
receiving area (2005: 13). There have been several studies that consider the nature of 
migrants, whether being environmentally induced or driven by conflict, to be a 
determinant on the risk of conflict in a receiving country (Forsberg 2009a; Salehyan 
2005; Buhaug & Gleditsch 2008). However, it is far from obvious that the reasons for 
migration will have significant security implications for the host area. Lack of 
conceptual clarity and data limitations has restricted the opportunity to empirically 
study the possible impacts of environmental migration across cases (Buhaug et al. 
2008: 28). What constitutes a refugee might not be sufficiently defined through formal 
specifications, but presumes a subjective understanding of the situation. 
 
Motives for flight are normally associated with conflict. Although present in earlier 
literature, the influence of environmental factors on refugee flows, has received 
increasing attention. One may distinguish between the environment as primary 
objective for fleeing, and the environment being an accessory interacting with other 
motivating factors. Unruh, Krol and Kliot speak of forced migration as being “one of 
the direct or indirect effects of global environmental change (2004: VII).” They further 
argue that such migration, leading to what they call environmental refugees most 
likely will have significant social, economic and political consequences. They predict 
a political and economic tension raised explicitly by an increase in the number of 
refugees that in turn may lead to conflict situations. This conflict potential spurs from 
most contemporary governments ability to deal with such a situation (ibid). Zolberg 
and Benda claim that the primary push factor is political, and not environmental (2001: 
46). Weiner argues that there are further trends that demonstrate an increase in internal 
conflicts, much due to ethnic conflict. Wars between states remain a diminishing, but 
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nevertheless significant source of refugee flows. It is also found that the number of 
refugees produced increases far more rapidly than the number of countries producing 
refugees, implying an increase in refugees per conflict. This increase is claimed to be a 
consequence of the natural population increase in countries of origin, the availability 
of arms on both sides of a conflict lowering the bar of taking to arms, and the 
increased use of antipersonnel mines causing menace toward the population that 
persist even past the original conflict‟s end (1996: 6, 25-26). 
 
 Lee argues that, as hypothesised from a neo-Malthusian perspective, high population 
density within nations may per se cause social disintegration and, at the extreme, 
increase the risk of violent conflict over limited resources. Additional population 
pressure in already overpopulated areas, such as Third World countries are often 
aggravated by large-scale flows of migrants and refugees (Lee 2001: 11-13). 
Understandings of the term „overpopulation‟ is however not a given. This stems from 
the acknowledgement of the fact that there is no intuitively ideal ratio between 
population and resources. Limiting overpopulation to the Third World is also 
misleading, as developing countries may well be far less densely populated, and still 
have the capacity to absorb these. Goldstone insists on the security implications of 
population change, even with a possible decrease in population growth (Goldstone 
2001: 96-97). The importance of agriculture and access to resources is also 
emphasised: 
 
Many countries may well experience collisions between their agrarian 
populations and access to land, between the expansion of their labour force, 
educated aspiring elites, urban population, and youth cohorts and the 
absorption rate of their economies, and […] between migrants and resident 
populations that inflame ethnic and regional tension (Goldstone 2001: 99). 
 
24 
 
Concerns of both population growth and resource constraints are rejected by Boserup 
(1981) who holds that these are vital to promote technological progress. 
„Cornucopians‟ such as Boserup and Simon, reject the Malthusian assumption that 
population promotes resource scarcity and promotes civil strife. Concerning 
agriculture for instance, Boserup expects a parallel progression in agricultural 
technology as pressure on the land increases (Boserup 1981). Simon (1996) argues that 
resource depletion is avoided through the technological process. It seems an increase 
in population is understood as an increase in people to innovate.  
 
Migration is at large considered to be an intermediate stage linking environmental 
degradation to conflict (Homer-Dixon 1991; 1994). One may speculate that refugee 
populations increase conflict risk given a scenario of an overwhelming of local 
services, and provoking violence and resentment in receiving areas. Suhrke, however, 
claims that such expectations belong in the realm of local fears, rather than in social 
reality (Suhrke 1993: 34). She claims it is a common misperception that conflict will 
ensue when people are displaced, and argues that this can only be the case in zero-sum 
interaction, however actual or perceived (1997: 257-258). Weiner and Teitelbaum, 
however, see a conflict potential proper to refugee populations. There is a real concern 
that massive flows of refugees offer a setting where aggressive states and non-state 
actors may strategically „place‟ their operative‟s sensitive locations abroad (2001: 
108). Also Forsberg underlines such conflict risk assigned to refugees in particular, 
investigating possible contagion effects between refugees and neighbouring countries 
(2009a). Looking at the spread of conflict trough migration-flows is encouraged by 
evidence suggesting that ethnic conflicts, and thereby also ethnic groups, are not 
customarily confined within the borders of one particular state, implying transnational 
linkages between ethnic groups involved in conflict and group members living in a 
neighbouring country (Forsberg 2009a: 25-26). 
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Even though developed societies are less susceptible to environmental stress triggered 
by increased population pressure, most refugees migrate between developing 
countries. In such areas, relatively small numbers of refugees may present significant 
challenges, generating enormous pressures. Given the magnitude of global 
environmental damage, the contribution to environmental degradation caused by 
refugees may be minimal. Even so, unexpected increases in population may be a 
challenge to the ecological balance in the affected area, and this in turn may generate 
economic and social strains (Lee 2001: 110-112). Taking this reasoning even further, 
one may contemplate that in extreme these „strains‟ may result in violent conflict. 
Where the number of refugees is high, and their stay prolonged, refugees increase the 
rate of resource consumption and depletion, which accelerates environmental 
degradation (ibid). This leads to intensified competition between the native and the 
newly arrived populations over scarce land and resources, and may again lead to 
further migration. The conclusion drawn from this strain of thought is that 
environmental and/or political crises producing cross-border refugees may well 
generate “other refugee-producing environmental changes and/or conflicts in a 
receiving nation” (ibid).  
 
Dramatic growth in cross-border population movement manifests itself all over the 
world. This growth mostly occurs between developing countries, often already strained 
on resources. There are conflicting perceptions of exactly what may happen after 
refugees arrive in a host country. Lee distinguishes between “combatant” and “non-
combatant refugees”. Other than obvious conflict-generating qualities of combatant 
refugees, the last category raises challenges of its own. The non-combatant refugees 
may arguably become politicized and build their own community, and thereby 
accelerating existing internal instability in the host state, when the possibility of 
returning home in the near future is slim (2001: 109). This prediction differs 
significantly from that of those who believe that a longer stay in the host country will 
stimulate more or less harmonic integration in the receiving state.  
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Reuveny identifies at least four complementary processes relating what he calls 
“climate-induced migration” to conflict. These four processes leading from migration 
to conflict are competition by the burdening of the economic and resource base in the 
receiving area; ethnic tension both between migrants and residents or by ethnic divides 
despite nationality; distrust between the host and receiving area; and fault lines 
following existing socioeconomic patterns (Reuveny 2007: 659). In identifying these 
processes to receiving areas that are particularly prone to conflict, Reuveny stresses 
the impact and potential tension caused by migration. It is not unreasonable to suggest 
that such strains on receiving areas may expect levels of unrest, if not straight out 
conflict. In Reuveny study, which has a self acclaimed Malthusian taste, it is nuanced 
that although not to overrule the possibility of conflict, climate-induced migration does 
not have to lead to conflict. Migration can even benefit the absorbing area by e.g. 
increasing the workforce and tax-base (2007: 660). Lee argues along the same lines, 
that the political balance in a state or area may be rocked by the multiple consequences 
of changes in demographics resulting from migration (Lee 2001: 14). She argues that 
in multiethnic and heterogenic societies burdened by conflict among contending 
linguistic, ethnic, or religious groupings, foreign populations may disturb domestic 
equilibrium. The argument is that given the crucial part demographic factors play in a 
democratic process and the political framework of “one person, one vote”, locals may 
believe to lose political domination over their own land (ibid.). The Swiss research 
project „Environment and Conflict‟ (ENCOP) also recognizes the conflict potential in 
migration and environmental scarcity. This project claims that demographically 
induced conflict appears when and where there are clear contradictions between 
economic and ecological carrying capacity. Indicators of this become visible through 
“shrinking per-capita allotments of arable land”. This is also the underlying 
assumption in this Thesis‟ empirical analysis, and the operationalization of the 
resource scarcity variable. The first hypothesis explores the relationships of migration 
pressure, resource scarcity and violent conflict. 
 
Hypothesis I: Migration pressure is particularly likely to increase the risk of 
conflict in the context of increasing renewable resource scarcity.  
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2.3. The Impact of Migration on Different Types of Violence 
It is claimed to have been found empirical evidence relating both to the positive causal 
relationship between environmental scarcity and conflict, but also to the very nature of 
conflict. Homer-Dixon claims that environmental scarcity rarely leads directly to 
interstate conflict, as states are unable to quickly and with ease convert renewable 
resources into assets that importantly augment their power. In addition, the countries 
that depend the most on renewable resources tend to be poor and therefore have fewer 
capabilities for aggression (Homer-Dixon 2001; 1994; 1999). Scarcities limit already 
fragile societies‟ ability to cope with negative changes in the access of resources, by 
the additional stress this imposes, and thereby reducing both agricultural and economic 
activity, ultimately weakening the state (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998: 280f). Thereby; 
“environmental scarcity is mainly an indirect cause of violence, and this violence is 
internal to countries (Homer-Dixon 1999: 18).” In this context, conflict is 
characterized as tending to be “persistent, diffuse, and sub-national.” This type of 
conflict is anticipated to increase intensively in the coming decades, under the 
assumption that scarcities rapidly worsen in several parts of the world (Homer-Dixon 
1994: 39). Smaller, rather than larger conflicts are considered more interesting in this 
setting (Homer-Dixon 1994; 1995). This claim has found empirical bearing besides the 
authors of this claim. Hauge and Ellingsen, after operationalizing Homer-Dixon‟s 
Environmental Scarcity, demonstrates that environmental degradation seems to have a 
stronger impact on the incidence of smaller rather than larger armed conflicts (1998). 
The increased possibility of relatively local conflicts at low-intensity levels may in the 
long run have severe implications. Salehyan and Gleditsch claim that periods of low-
intensity conflicts, in practice, are “likely to be associated with a higher likelihood of 
future large-scale conflict (2006: 350).” 
 
Fighting a government army requires great organizational efforts and considerable 
resources. From this perspective, it may be argued that conflicts between non-state 
actors (non-state conflicts) are more likely to occur, given that these parties are 
affected to a greater extent by environmental scarcities, compared to a given 
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government. The potential underground involvement of a government should however 
not be underestimated (Theisen & Brandsegg 2007: 6)
7
. The traditional focus on 
interstate and civil wars when investigating resource scarcity and conflict is criticized. 
The argument is that there is an “inverse relationship between the importance of scarce 
resources and the scale of conflict”. This implies a call of attention to lower-level 
conflicts, not presuming the state as an active part (ibid 2007: 2). Given that non-state 
conflict is understood as a breach of the state monopoly of the use of force, the event 
of such conflicts must somehow indicate a silent permission from the state, or an 
inability to prevent it (ibid: 6). Theisen assumes that in a conflict over resources, one 
should expect that non-state conflicts be most likely, relative to those where the state is 
an active part. On the premise that scarcity leads to grievances and poverty, deprived 
groups will be too weak to engage in conflict with state forces (2006: 35). Suliman 
argues that scarcity is most important to more local and smaller conflicts, where the 
state is not necessarily an active part. These „local in clinch‟ have a more peripheral 
status relative conflicts of the state, as these conflicts are less likely to evolve into full-
scale civil wars (1999b). Given the state‟s neglect of economically less significant 
areas, the void of a mitigating third party is filled by local rule. Historically 
cooperative bonds between groups are weakened in parallel to the increase of scarcity. 
Upsurges of conflict between neighbouring groups can be caused by e.g. the „desert 
versus the oasis syndrome‟, where one group inhabits a relatively more fertile eco-
zone than the other (ibid. 1999b: 187). These premises result in the following 
hypothesis, implying the nature of conflict. 
 
Hypothesis II: Violent conflict resulting from the interaction between migration 
pressure and renewable resource scarcity, is of a low-intensity nature, and does 
not presuppose government involvement. 
 
Suhrke emphasises that where displacement becomes long-term, the conflict potential 
rises in parallel to the migrant population‟s acquired autonomy or influential 
                                                 
7
 Although, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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allegiances. A prevail over the powerlessness inherent with the refugee or migrant 
status, will allow an increase in demand to their hosts. Also, gradual migration is 
expected to have potentially violent outcomes, and as such, migration may have a 
cumulative effect that may place additional stress on already fragile political and social 
systems (1997: 263-264). The neo-Malthusian logic of resource depletion is followed 
when emphasising that population size and density, as well as individual consumption, 
escalate the shortage of resources and environmental degradation. With increasingly 
scarce resources, more expensive and environmentally damaging processes are 
required in order to provide resources for additional people. Such ecological stress can 
launch fierce competition among the affected population, and possibly lead to violent 
conflict. Lee argues that there are several stages a society may go through before 
resorting to violence. To be able to clarify the evolution of such conflicts enables the 
anticipation of “a new dimension of global insecurity”, according to Lee (2001: 21). 
 
 
2.4. Migration and International Aid 
There is an articulated need for the international community to mitigate and adapt to 
possible large-scale displacement (Brown 2007: 29). There is reason to believe that the 
mere presence of a third party may have a calming effect on a country‟s conflict level. 
This will, of course, to large extent also depend on the kind of presence. One could 
contemplate that a strong economic presence of third parties would provide an 
economic incentive to keep domestic peace, out of consideration for foreign 
investments. United Nations agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
may have more explicit interests in peace, as these third parties are used to obtain 
exactly this and mediate between conflicting parties. By explicit mandates aimed at 
both preventing and restraining conflict, they already have attentiveness, and an alert 
concerning precarious situations. In particular, humanitarian refugee assistance may be 
of importance for lowering domestic conflict levels, not only amongst the migrants 
themselves, but also in meeting with the population in the host area.  
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There is nevertheless no ignoring the controversy on the subject, and there is no clear 
understanding of how different kinds of presence might influence outcomes. In this 
Thesis, official development aid will be investigated. The perspective of aid‟s 
mediating effect, on resource scarcity in particular, is challenged by claims of relief 
agencies and host government policies unknowingly fuelling conditions under which 
resource use conflict may result in violence (Suliman 1999a). Counter-intuitively to 
popular belief, humanitarian assistance to refugees may have exacerbating effects on 
conflict (Lischer 2003: 5). Tarp and Hjertholm stress that humanitarian aid may both 
intensify and prolong conflict when fallen into the hands of belligerents. The giving of 
aid to combatants based in refugee camps is another problem, and a longstanding one 
at that. However, it is emphasised that the unintended support of combatants is not the 
fault of humanitarian aid per se, but stems from the failing security for its delivery 
(2000: 306-307). The effects and effectiveness of foreign aid as a stabilizer in and 
after conflict is obviously controversial, and when intended effects fail to materialise, 
frustration and disillusion may follow. 
 
[t]o be very candid…who the hell cared about Rwanda? Who really 
comprehends that more people were killed, injured ad displaced in three and a 
half months in Rwanda than in the whole of Yugoslavian campaign, in which we 
poured sixty thousand troops and more. The whole of the Western world is 
there- we’re pouring billions in there… (Gourevitch 1998 in Tarp and 
Hjertholm 2000: 316). 
 
Studies show that foreign aid at least reduces the duration of conflict, and it is claimed 
that foreign aid may be an important tool for policy-makers and aid agencies alike, in 
preventing future conflict (Ree and Nillesen 2006: 17). Aid can claim to be important 
in limiting the intensity-level in conflict between locals and migrants. This may be 
enabled through the establishment of structures created in order to reach different 
groups. Organisations can enjoy greater trust among local groups, relative to the 
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current government. Suhrke argues that international relief does indeed have a 
mediating effect on conflict, by tending to a migrant population‟s most immediate 
needs, and thereby releasing receiving areas of this additional potential strain. This is 
suggested to reduce the conflict potential in a given area (1997: 270).  
 
As Kahl (2006), Salehyan also stresses the importance of the state, and its mitigating 
effects on environmental degradation and conflict, but adds an emphasis to the 
urgency of international donor assistance to countries (especially developing 
countries) experiencing deteriorating environmental conditions. Given the interaction 
of poverty and environmental stress, more severe outcomes are to be expected relative 
to areas with better resources for crisis management. The recommended international 
assistance does not necessarily stem from altruistic motives. Generous assistance 
programs restrain potential and actual emigration at its source, and is considered 
considerably more efficient than reactive immigration enforcement initiatives (2005: 
15-16). Myers, a pioneer in the environmental refugee problematic, was sure to 
emphasise foreign aid when presenting his influential predictions of potential 
displacement. He stressed the importance of aid reaching the main countries and 
regions of concern to the likely future production of environmental refugees. He 
claimed that these regions hosted the poorest of the poor, and estimated that this would 
“relieve the problem while it is still becoming a problem, i.e., before it becomes 
entrenched”. Those in absolute poverty are most likely to migrate as a result of 
environmental distress (1997: 178). Fundamentally however, it is of crucial 
importance to suitably recognize, comprehend and respond to the issue by dealing with 
the assumed sources of the problem, rather than reacting to its symptoms (ibid: 181).  
 
The assumption in this thesis is that international aid will have a mitigating effect on 
the conflict potential in a country. The data used in this analysis is based on official 
development assistance (ODA) and official aid donations (per capita). One may argue 
that such contributions are relatively less likely to stray, be more efficiently spent and 
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have the opportunity to finance bigger projects than private donations. This is however 
not certain.  
 
Hypothesis III: International presence reduces the risk of conflict due to 
migration pressure in resource scarce areas.  
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3.0. Research Design and Data 
Tying together the theoretical assumptions that underlie this thesis‟ hypotheses, 
including concerns about the nature of conflicts, is a neo-Malthusian perspective on 
population pressure, the relevance of resource scarcity, and an expectation that the 
causal relationships between these elements are measurable and statistically 
significant. One of the, perhaps, most controversial aspects of these theories is 
resource scarcity, which is heavily advocated by Homer-Dixon and colleagues as 
having a legitimate independent causal role:  
 
Scholars and policymakers must take into account the independent causal role 
of environmental scarcity if they are to understand and respond to many 
important cases of civil violence around the world (Schwartz, Deligiannis and 
Homer-Dixon 2001: 278) 
 
The primary objective of my master thesis is, as mentioned, to investigate the 
relationship between migration pressure, resource scarcity and violent conflict. By 
applying a quantitative research design and using Stata software, I will analyze how 
added migration pressures in areas where renewable resources are scarce affect the 
probability of violent conflict (both conventional and non-conventional). Whether 
international aid can mediate the risk of conflict is also examined.  
 
 Data have been collected and compiled from already existing datasets. These sources 
are the Uppsala University and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the United 
Nations Population Division, Urdal (2005), Gleditsh et al. (2002), Salehyan and 
Gleditsch (2007) and the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
(USCRI). The time-series is 1950-2007, the 2007-limit being determined by the 
dependent variable (non-state conflict), which unfortunately is not updated further. 
However, the observations are overall so many, and the time-span of such length, that 
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this will suffice for a thorough analysis. The units of analysis are limited to those used 
in the dataset of the dependent variable, which are the same countries that base the 
PRIO armed conflict dataset. The amount of units of analysis is considered sufficient 
for the purpose of this thesis.   
 
 
3.1. Previous Empirical Studies 
Previous empirical (quantitative) research on the subject of migration, environment 
and conflict, have produced a diversity of findings. Although there have been 
conducted studies on all the main relationships presented in this thesis, the 
combination factor is what justifies this particular study. The resource scarcity and 
conflict nexus seems to be increasingly debated parallel to its rise on the political 
agenda. Gleditsch (1998) more generally comments the literature by emphasising that 
despite an abundance of declarations on the relationship between environment and 
conflict, there is, as of yet, no consensus considering the causal mechanisms neither 
empirically nor theoretically (ibid: 383-384)
8
. Homer-Dixon claims to find evidence of 
noteworthy relationships between resource scarcity and conflict. Both his theoretical 
and empirical findings have however been equally criticized (Gleditsh 1998; Gleditsch 
& Urdal 2002; Homer-Dixon 1994; 1995; 1999; Homer-Dixon & Blitt 1998; Peluso & 
Watts 2001). The notion of „conflict‟ is often operationalized as civil war. This may be 
due to empirical studies finding insignificant correlation(s) between the outbreak of 
war between states and resource scarcity. It is recognized that although resource 
scarcity is frequently considered a theoretical source of intergovernmental conflict, 
this is rarely supported empirically. A pioneer study that quantitatively investigates the 
relationship between resource scarcity and the incidence of internal armed conflict is 
Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), also focusing on neo-Malthusian reasoning. These find 
that freshwater scarcity, land degradation, population density and deforestation 
increase the risk of civil conflict. Also de Soysa (2002) has found support for a link 
                                                 
8
 This is also highlighted in Tir and Diehl (1998), where the literature suggests a link between 
population variables and international conflict (interstate conflict). 
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between high population density and internal armed conflict using large cross-national 
time-series studies. However, empirical research has, so far, failed to find unanimous 
evidence for a resource scarcity and conflict scenario. Even in an attempt to replicate 
the study of Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), Theisen (2006) did not find the empirical 
evidence to support the claims of the original authors.  
 
Despite population growth and density being associated with increased risk, Raleigh 
and Urdal (2007) find that the effects of political and economic factors far outweigh 
those between demographic and environmental factors at the local level, and conflict. 
The effects of land degradation and water scarcity are weak or insignificant. Claims of 
a „new era of insecurity‟ following the end of the Cold War, is by Urdal (2005) found 
to have little empirical support, and the suppositions of environmental, and 
demographic factors threatening security and state stability are thereby unfounded. 
Boserup‟s (1965) general findings rather points to population pressure as a prerequisite 
for modernization as it gives rise to economies of scale, and in a later study finds that 
scarcity of arable land at an aggregate level appeared to reduce the risk of conflict 
(1981). Myers (1992) voices the notion of steep population growth and a 
discontinuous process of environmental change. This entails the degradation of a given 
resource exploited at a given level, until the exploitation exhausts the self-renewable 
capacity of that resource (Myers 1992: 116).  
 
Influxes of refugees into an area can cause considerable stress on natural resources, 
leading to both environmental and social impacts (UNHCR 1996; Black & Sessay 
1997) Focusing on environmentally induced migration (environmental refugees) a 
major and interesting conclusion in Suhrke‟s study is that insofar as environmental 
degradation causes displacement of people, it is more likely to generate exploitation 
rather than conflict (1993: 35). Salehyan and Gleditsch quantitatively link refugee 
migration to civil conflict in receiving states (2006). There are presented several 
interpretations of this. Economic and resource competition, disruption of a previous 
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ethnic balance, and the spreading of arms and ideologies all hold explanational 
powers. Hugo emphasises the international dimension of the migration-environment 
relationship, which he assumes to be of increasing significance. He investigates the 
relationship between migration and the environment, and calls for increased 
international involvement (1996). Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan consider the impact 
environmental change has on migration and conflict. They argue that changes in 
migration patterns due to the environment, is highly unlikely. They further claim that 
environmental migration tends to be short term and internal, and the potential for 
instigating conflict is low (2008). Weiner and Teitelbaum (2001) argue that it is 
appropriate to suggest a connection between demography and levels of violence, given 
that that worldwide increase in displaced populations such as refugee flows and 
internally displaced persons have been among the most notable developments over the 
past quarter century (ibid: 51). 
 
 
3.2. Method: Logistic Regression 
Given that the dependent variable is dichotomous with the values conflict (1) and non-
conflict (0), the most suitable methodological design is a maximum likelihood logistic 
model. The dependent variable is two-fold, entailing individual analysis of both 
conventional conflict and non-state conflict. The relationships between the dependent 
and the independent variables are not expected to be linear; as such a regression model 
would suppose possibilities for predicting values of Y outside the 0-1 interval. The aim 
of the analysis is to investigate how the share of having a particular value on the 
dependent variable varies for different values on the independent variables. Shares can 
by definition only vary between 0 and 1, so answering to this; these are transformed to 
log odds of having a particular value on the dependent variable. The logarithmic 
transformation extends the range of the dependent variable from - ∞ to + ∞ (Skog 
2007: 351-366). The challenge lies in finding (co)variations between the units, and 
  
37 
 
find significant correlations between the dependent and independent variables. A 
logistic model can be written as (ibid: 358):  
 
 
 
To facilitate interpretation of correlation between variables, odds ratio, rather than log 
odds are applied
9
. Odds ratios are the antilogarithms of the log odds (the regression 
coefficients). Odds ratio measures the relative change in the odds of having the value 1 
in the dependent variable resulting from a one unit increase in an explanatory variable, 
controlled for all other variables (Skog 2007: 364-365). 
 
 
3.3. Time-Series Regression Analysis 
Time-series analysis allows studying successive variations in the dependent variable at 
one or several observation units over longer periods of time. This method can help 
determine the nature of the effects the independent variables have on the dependent, 
and may determine whether these are durable or temporary phenomenon‟s, and 
whether they emerge gradually or abruptly (Skog 2007: 82). A commonly used 
definition of this type of analysis argues that “time series analysis accounts for the fact 
that data points taken over time may have an internal structure (such as 
autocorrelation, trend or seasonal variation) that should be accounted for” 
(NIST/SEMATECH). Time-series analysis includes a spectrum of exploratory and 
hypothesis testing methods that have two main goals. The first goal involves 
identifying the nature of the phenomenon represented by the sequence of observation. 
The second goal represents an ability to forecast (predicting future values of the 
                                                 
9
 Implies the use of the ‟logistic‟ rather than ‟logit‟ command in the statistical tool Stata. 
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variable), based on the previous time-series. Both of these goals assume an 
identification of pattern(s), and a formal description of these (StatSoft)
10
.  
 
 
3.4. Operationalization of variables 
3.3.1. Dependent Variable 
3.3.1.1. Violent Conflict 
The dependent variables are based on two Uppsala/PRIO conflict datasets entailing 
both conventional and non-state conflict. For these two „Violent Conflict‟ variables 
there is a lowered intensity requirement of 25 battle-related deaths per year, rather than 
the traditional limit of 1000. Conventional conflict data presupposes “a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force
11
 between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state” 
(Gleditsch et al. 2001: 619). Non-state conflict understands the 25 battle-related death 
minimum as results of “the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, 
neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths in a year” (UCDP 2009). The lowered battle-related death criteria is not only 
due to the data alone, but is very much motivated by theoretical arguments that imply 
that the kind of conflict to be expected in a resource scarce setting is that of low-
intensity. These data reflect conventional, as well as non-state conflict. The last 
                                                 
10
 This type of data is often complimented by cross-sectional analysis in order to reduce the 
risk of spurious correlations due to underlying factors that represent problems in the analysis 
of some variables, is not present, or at least less present with other units of observation (Skog 
2007: 83). This is also done in this analysis, although the comments on this follow in 
footnotes, as it is considered but a valuable supplement. 
 
11
 The „use of armed force‟ may need further specification and refers to the “use of arms in 
order to promote the parties‟ general position in the conflict resulting in deaths (the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook Version 4-2009: 1).” „Arms‟ concern “any 
material means, e.g. manufactured weapons but also sticks, stones, fire, water etc (ibid)”. 
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mentioned type of conflict may in itself allow a more thorough registration of conflict 
relevant to the principal independent variable of renewable resource scarcity.  
 
The conventional conflicts available by UCDP/PRIO use the common civil war 
operationalization-procedure for coding „onset‟. This entails coding every outbreak of 
conflict either as a result of entirely new conflicts, or if two or more years have passed 
since casualties were below the required level. When considering „onset‟, the different 
conflicts within a country will not be taken into account, and the outbreak of a conflict, 
be they related or not, always needs to meet the 2-year requirement of fewer than 25 
battle-related deaths. If there are observed several outbreaks of conflict in the same 
year, the first actual outbreak will set the basis for the evaluation of the 2-year “peace” 
criteria. The dependent variable conflict onset, is coded 1 for the first year of a conflict 
and 0 if no conflict takes place in the state in that particular year (dichotomous). 
Subsequent ongoing years of the same conflict are dropped from the estimation 
sample. In cases where there are multiple conflict onsets in a country, data on a new 
onset is included if it occurred during the years when another conflict was ongoing 
(Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006)
12
. Reliable data below a two-year limit of inactivity is 
considered difficult, although there is no authoritative answer to how conflict should 
be coded (Strand 2006: 9).  
 
The dependent variable indicating non-state conflicts were initially thought to also 
measure onset. However, given that the data does not specify the end of a conflict and 
that there are only available data for five years, this is difficult
13
. Therefore, non-state 
conflicts are coded by incidence. The amount of conflicts in a given year will not be 
                                                 
12
 Alternative measures of coding new „onset‟ cases when new rebel groups enter the conflict, 
have been estimated by Salehyan & Gleditsch, resulting in insignificant variations of results 
(2006: 350 n. 45). 
 
13
 This information, together with other updates, will be available in the updated version of 
this dataset due in August of this year. The data will then also cover the years from 1989 
throughout 2009 
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taken into account. The variable is coded 1 in the case of conflict, and otherwise holds 
the value of 0. These data are limited to sufficiently few years, so that issues of time-
dependency are limited. In addition, countries with conflict in the first year of 
registered data (2002) would be coded as „onset‟ while it is probable to assume that all 
of these did not break out then. 
 
 
3.4.2. Independent Variables 
3.4.2.1. Migration Pressure 
Migration is a complex phenomenon, and thereby poses difficulties for reasonable 
operationalizations of the concept. Aware of these challenges however, and the 
necessary limitations following the operationalization, I am fairly confident in having 
found a sufficiently explanatory measure. This study is not concerned with a state‟s 
population per se, but rather the additional demographic pressure as a factor external to 
natural population growth. Variations of the proportions of this additional pressure 
over time, and investigated relative to the availability of arable land is what is of 
interest, as it is the scarcity of resources that is hypothesised as paramount to the 
likelihood of the outbreak of conflict. Migration pressure is hereby operationalized as 
forced migration, and is defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) as: 
 
[A person] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
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unwilling to return to it (Article 1, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees). 
 
The focus in this thesis is forced migration crossing borders, namely refugees, 
however, their reasons for fleeing being of less importance. The refugee data used in 
this thesis stems from two different sources, as the time-series vary, and these will be 
investigated separately. Salehyan and Gleditsch‟s ”Replication data for refugees and 
the spread of civil war” (2007) and the Centre for Systemic Peace‟s (CSP) data on 
”forcibly displaced populations, 1964-2008” (USCRI, annual). The former dataset 
have gathered information from the Population Data Unit of the UN and the High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and cover the years 1946 until 2003 (the time-
series of this analysis begins in 1950). The refugee data made available by CSP and 
compiled by USCRI, spans from 1964 until 2008 (the upper limit for this analysis‟ 
time series being 2007). The information used from these datasets concern the number 
of incoming refugees to a host country, and these datasets are by far the most complete 
on the issue. All refugee data are log transformed in order to reduce the impact of 
extreme values. 
 
 
3.4.2.2. Renewable Resource Scarcity 
Renewable resources are natural resources that theoretically regenerate themselves 
indefinitely, through normal ecological processes. Scarcity of such resources emerge 
when the flow or stock of the resource is quantitatively exhaust or qualitatively 
degraded at a rate faster than its regeneration, or distributed so as to artificially deprive 
individuals of the resource (Kahl 2006: 31). Population growth, be that on a national or 
international scale, has often been the focal point of models of environmental 
degradation. Growing populations have been considered one of the factors that greatly 
exacerbate poverty, starvation, economic stagnation and resource depletion (Tir & 
Diehl 2001: 58). Homer-Dixon emphasises that what should be investigated are not 
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absolute sizes but rather resource supply relative to the demand and social distribution 
of that resource (Schwartz, Deligiannis & Homer-Dixon 2001: 275).  
 
Common forms of environmental degradation include land degradation, 
desertification, rising sea levels induced by global warming and deforestation with its 
many consequences (Suhrke 1993: 3). This thesis primarily focuses on arable land and 
its availability.
14
 Theoretically this focus is a natural limitation. Homer-Dixon, as a 
chief provider of premise concerning resource scarcity and conflict, defines renewable 
resources as being cropland, water, forest and fisheries (Homer-Dixon & Blitt 1998). 
The most important of these resources are cropland and freshwater (Homer-Dixon 
1999; Kahl 2006). Homer-Dixon believes that environmental scarcity has “it‟s most 
profound effects on people‟ lives in rural areas” (Homer-Dixon 1999: 166). He claims 
that land stress and bulging populations may generate waves of refugees that spill 
across borders, having destabilizing effects on the recipient‟s domestic order and on 
international stability (Homer-Dixon 1991: 77). Myers (1992) argues that population 
growth in conjunction with environmental degradation that to a great extent stems 
from this very population growth, overwhelms the environmental underpinnings of 
agriculture. A state‟s functional capacity heavily relies on the agricultural sector‟s self-
sufficiency in times of demographic and environmental stress (Kahl 2006: 47). It may 
also be argued that this resource indirectly takes into account a certain freshwater 
availability, since this a predicament of agriculture. Brown follows this reasoning by 
arguing that agricultural commodities may very well function as proxy for key natural 
resources, like water and land, and can increase the risk of competition, and perhaps 
conflict, over scarce resources (2008: 1).  
 
                                                 
14
 There are several alternative measures. Other frequently mentioned resources are fisheries 
and forests. Arable land, however, seems to be most fitting in this context. First and foremost, 
the focus on arable land can be legitimized theoretically. Secondly there are significant data 
challenges both concerning availability and the diverting understandings of the mere 
measures of the mentioned alternative resources.  
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To illustrate this logic statistically, the „Potential Cropland‟ (per capita cropland 
scarcity) variable will be an important operationalization of the renewable resource 
scarcity concept. The operationalization demonstrates renewable resource scarcity by 
creating a variable of productive soil relative to population size, further indicating 
population pressure on these resources. The variable is defined as “all of a country‟s 
land that falls into the following land use categories: arable land, permanent crops, 
permanent pastures, and forests and woodland” (Urdal 2005: 424). This variable is log 
transformed given that there is reason to believe that there is no linear relationship 
between density and conflict
15
 (Tir & Diehl 2001). This transformation also excludes 
extreme cases possibly disturbing the results
16
. This measure originates from Urdal‟s 
study of 2005, and therefore needed a seven year update considering the scope of this 
analysis. The „Potential Cropland‟ variable represents the population pressure on the 
amount of land available for agriculture. Assuming insignificant changes in arable land 
during recent years, this variable was updated by calculating the annually updated 
population of each country relative to their respective year 2000 value on arable land
17
. 
The source data for these calculations are developed by the UN Population Division 
(Demographic Yearbook, annual), the World Development Indicators (World Bank), 
World Factbook (CIA annual), Encyclopaedia Britannica (Britannica annual) and The 
Statistical Abstract of the World (Reddy, 1994) for small states. 
 
The independent variable mapping the share of rural versus urban population within a 
given country is meant to give an idea of the domestic context. There is little and 
incomplete data on agricultural populations, resulting in this alternative measure. The 
assumption is that the rural population primarily relies on agriculture, while the urban 
                                                 
15
 When a country reaches a certain level of density, it is probable to expect a decrease in 
effect. It is a larger transition for a smaller country to have a population density go from 200 
to 1200, than it is for a larger country to go from 5000 to 6000 
 
16
 Extreme-value countries such as e.g. Singapore and Bahrain. 
 
17
 This is also the assumption in the original study, where the potential cropland is based on a 
single observation per country only dating from the 1993-2001 period (Ural 2005: 424). 
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population does not. This is a more inaccurate, but arguably reasonable, proxy.  The 
information used directly in the analysis is the percentage of rural population. These 
data stem from the UN Population Division (UN 2008), and spans throughout the 
time-series of the analysis (1950-2007) with data updates for each country every fifth 
year.  
 
 
3.4.2.3. International Aid 
International aid includes net official development assistance and official aid 
(measured in current US $). A limitation of this variable is that it lacks a geographic 
component, which can mean that in practice, the aid resources can be used in different 
parts of the country other than those areas hosting refugees. Nonetheless, there are 
other consequences of receiving aid that may be considered to ameliorate a refugee 
situation, and thereby reduce the potential conflict level. There is a direct effect given 
that aid presupposes a system of distribution that in turn can enable a more efficient 
handling of refugees, compared to countries where this is non-present. Foreign aid can 
also serve as an indicator of the degree to which donor-countries would be interested, 
or likely, to get involved in a crisis- or refugee situation. By this logic, high levels of 
foreign aid should indicate a willingness of third parties to contribute, if the situation 
so requires. To best measure this presence, data on the amount of aid per capita will be 
used. These data are collected and developed by the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2008). 
 
 
3.4.3. Control Variables 
There are two different development indicators in the analysis. The Infant Mortality 
Rate (IMR) is expected to better fulfil its intention, but the traditional measure using 
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Gleditsch 2002)
18
 will serve as a control, as 
well as comparison. Using country-year as the unit of analysis, and the onset of 
conflict as the dependent variable, problems of autocorrelation may occur. A country 
having experienced conflict in a given year is inherently likely to be in conflict the 
following year also (Hauge & Ellingsen 2001: 47; Hegre et al. 2001). In order to 
reduce the potential impact of this problem, the „brevity of peace‟ variable is used to 
control for conflict in the previous year/ years since last conflict (Hegre et al. 2001). 
This variable controls for time dependency in the study of conflict, and assumes a 
positive relationship between past conflict and the risk of new conflict onset. The 
rationale predicts the temporal dependence to be strongest directly after a conflict, and 
thereon decrease with time. It may be expected that the correlation between population 
pressure and conflict will decrease after reaching some threshold. “States can handle 
only so much conflict and at some limiting point additional population pressure will 
not produce any greater likelihood of conflict involvement or escalation (Tir & Diehl 
2001: 69).” By this logic the total population data is log transformed.  
 
Regime is theoretically argued to integrate the variables of opportunity structure and 
state capacity (Schwartz, Deligiannis & Homer-Dixon 2001: 279). The Polity IV 
scheme examines “concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in 
governing institutions”. The "Polity Score" illustrates this regime authority spectrum 
on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy) (Marshall & Jaggers 2002)
19
. The effect of democracy on conflict is 
debated, and the very term „democracy‟ is claimed to be used too loosely by lay 
commentators and experts alike. A comprehensive understanding of the term includes 
an extraordinarily complex “set of social phenomena and institutions that have 
complicated and multiple effects on the incidence of social turmoil and violence 
(Homer-Dixon 1999: 182)”. Theories concerned with democracy and conflict tend to 
                                                 
18
 These are updated until 2004, while the data on IMR stretches throughout the period of 
analysis (1950-2007). 
19
 The Polity variable is imputed for all years that miss or that uses transition codes. The 
„polmiss‟ variable is intended to discover the possible distortion that this may provoke. This 
dummy variable is included to avoid loosing too many observations. 
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indicate that democracies experience less conflict and rebellion, relative to autocracies 
and in-between regime types. However, note that the democratization process itself 
might generate conflict (Hauge & Ellingsen 2001: 42). Others claim that it is 
democracies in transition, meaning regimes in a process of change, are most inclined 
to experience conflict. This suggests that the democratization process in itself may 
generate conflict (Hegre et al. 2001). If the state failure hypothesis is an important 
pathway to armed conflict, it should be expected that statistical controls for low state 
capacity and state failure should capture some of the explanatory power of the 
demographic and environmental variables. Previous studies have shown curvilinear 
coherence regarding the Polity variable, so the quadratic value of this variable is 
introduced in order to capture this effect. The control variable Polity squared checks 
for curvlinearity. The variable thereby assumes that the middle-values are those most 
prone to affect the dependent variable. This is theoretically defended by the 
assumption that the societies in polity transition are more likely to experience conflict, 
in contrast to the extreme values on this scale, that are either perfectly authoritarian or 
democratic (Hegre et al. 2001).   
 
 
3.4.4. Validity and Reliability  
Determining the quality of the analysis is influenced by validity and reliability 
assessments. Reliability is concerned with the degree to which data is measured 
without error, and implies a notion of replicability (Theisen 2006: 62). This entails the 
precision of measuring data. The validity depends on what is measured, and whether 
these entail the qualities and characteristics of the relevant research question. It 
indicates the quality of the empirical operationalizations of a theoretic definition 
(Hellevik 2002: 52-53, 471). The validity also suggests whether the indicators used 
actually fit the causal arguments of the theory. The reliability of the data is critical for 
the validity of an analysis. High reliability is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
  
47 
 
for high validity (Theisen 2006: 62). To ensure a defensible level of validity, necessary 
assumptions of logistic regression must be satisfied. The different data used for the 
analysis in this thesis have, almost all of them already been used in published studies 
(Urdal 2005, Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006), and stem from recognized sources of data 
collection (World Bank, United Nation Population Division etc). The reliability of the 
data is expected to be quite high. There are many observations, and no alarming 
amounts of missing
20
. Given that one of the main explanatory variables (refugees) has 
two different sources of data, the reliability should increase further, ensuring more 
accurate measures (this also applies to the development indicator IMR and GDP). 
 
The operationalizations of „migration pressure‟ and „renewable resource scarcity‟ are 
perhaps the variables that deserve the most scrutiny in regard to validity. The 
requirement of quantifiable values was a main concern when operationalizing 
migration pressure. Most migrate within their state‟s borders, and are so called internal 
migrant or internal refugees. Accurate numbers of these are however difficult to find, 
although there is an increase of interest concerning such migration patterns. 
Additionally there is no consensus on their very definition, making it difficult for 
empirical studies to determine who falls under this category. There are reasons to 
believe that internal migration poses less additional strains on resources relative to 
external migrant or refugees, indicating that cross-border migration is more relevant to 
the dependent variable (violent conflict).  
 
Renewable resource scarcity has not such an obvious solution as had the migration 
variable. When it comes to renewable resource scarcity, there are challenges both due 
to data and the conceptualization. Inspired by Urdal‟s solution to this problem, 
potential arable land, having already been theoretically identified as a main resource, 
together with population forms the „potential cropland‟ variable (2005). This 
                                                 
20
 Only the „aid‟ variable has substantial amount of missing, which is taken into account 
throughout the Thesis. 
48 
 
operationalization includes a population pressure aspect by considering scarcity 
relative to the population in the respective states, further increasing its relevance to the 
theoretic material of the thesis. The controls used, are all „standard‟ in quantitative 
studies on civil war.  
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4.0. Time-Series Analysis21 
The three previously presented hypotheses of this thesis expect that migration pressure 
(operationalized as refugees) and constraint on renewable resources (per capita 
availability of arable land) are problematic, and thereby increase the probability of 
conflict (both conventional and non-state). Aid (per capita) is further assumed to 
mediate the effects of migration. These assumptions are statistically explored through 
logistic regression analysis. The countries used in this analysis are restricted to those 
that enjoy independence, and meet the minimum requirement of 250 000 inhabitants 
(in year 2000)
22
. Migration pressure, operationalized as refugees, is the independent 
variable with the most emphasis. Two different sources of refugee data are used to 
ensure the most correct results as possible. The analysis, as a whole, spans over the 
years 1950 to 2007. The refugee data gathered by Salehyan and Gleditsch (2007) cover 
the years 1950-2001, and the data provided by the Center for Systemic Peace, last 
from 1964 to 2007. These data are analysed separately, and combined constitute the 
data material on refugees allowing full coverage of the time-period of the analysis. In 
all models, the main explanatory variable, indicating migration pressure, is examined 
alone together with the control variables. In order to more closely examine the data 
and either confirm or deny the presented hypothesis, the models will subsequently be 
expanded by the inclusion of the other variables and interaction terms as well as the 
controls.  
 
The Malthusian perspective is integrated in the analysis by the very variables under 
scrutiny. Although the theory is complex, the investigation of the above-mentioned 
variables is a reasonable simplification of main concepts. Likewise, it is difficult to 
                                                 
21
 All models have been run using both IMR and GDP separately, as development indicators. 
Although it does not explain the amount of variance, the Pseudo R2 indicates that IMR is 
slightly better suited for the majority of the models. The IMR measure will therefore be used 
when presenting the different models.  
 
22
 The country list is, throughout the analysis, based on an updated version of the dataset of 
Urdal 2005.  
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capture all aspects of Homer-Dixon‟s understanding of environmental scarcity. 
„Demand-induced‟ scarcity is measured by population growth, and further 
operationalized as incoming refugees. „Supply-induced‟ scarcity is measured as land 
degradation, and operationalized as per capita availability of actual and potential 
cultivable land. The politics of distribution entailed in the notion of „structural 
scarcity‟ is an effect not easily captured, at least not in this analysis, nor is it a priority 
of the thesis. Kahl sums up the reasoning of Goldstone and Homer-Dixon, which 
clarifies the expectations of the following analysis and the emphasis put on different 
aspect of the theory (population and environmental pressure, agriculture, aid and state 
capacity), resulting in the before-mentioned variables.  
 
[...] population and environmental pressures in developing countries often 
generate intense hardship among agricultural labourers and the urban poor. 
They contend, however, that strong capable states are typically able to prevent 
such deprivation coalescing into organized violence through a mix of relief for 
aggrieved individuals, co-optation of opposition leaders, and outright coercion. 
Therefore, large-scale violence is only likely to occur when social grievances 
emanating from rapid population growth, environmental degradation, and 
natural resource scarcity combine with eroding state authority and escalating 
intra-elite competition (Kahl 2006: 10). 
 
My analysis is not limited to the developing world, and has undergone necessary 
simplifications in order to conduct analysis. 
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4.1. Conventional Conflict 
When only considering the effects of migration pressure (refugees) in the models of 
conventional conflict (using both sources of refugee data), these are highly significant 
and thereby in accordance to the findings of Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006). This is 
reassuring, and provides an excellent basis for the remaining analysis. These authors 
understand the effects to imply a spreading of conflict by refugees, entailing the import 
of ideology arms etc. If the theoretical assumptions presented in this particular thesis 
are correct however, these effects should at least be partly dependent on high 
renewable resource scarcity and absence of international aid (and to a certain extent in 
a context of large rural populations). 
 
Table 1: Conventional Conflict Logistic Regression Results, 1964-2007 (Odds Ratio)
  
 Model Model Model Model Model 
Explanatory Variables 1.0.a 1.0.b 1,1 1,2 1,3 
Refugees_CSP 1.051*** 1.048*** 1.056*** 1.046*** 1.048*** 
Potential Cropland  0,968 0,971 0,947 0,968 
Aid per capita  0,998 0,998 0,998 0,998 
Rural Population  1,007 1,006 1,007 1,007 
Interaction Terms       
Refugees & Rural Population    0,999   
Refugees & Potential Cropland     0,989  
Refugee & Aid      1,000 
Control Variables      
Infant mortality rate 1.010*** 1.007*** 1.007*** 1.008*** 1.007*** 
Total Population 1.261*** 1.358*** 1.256*** 1.367*** 1.258*** 
Regime 1,008 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 
Regime, squared 0.985*** 0.986*** 0.986*** 0.986*** 0.986*** 
Missing regime data 1,649 1,040 0,92 1,147 1,050 
Controls for statistical dependency      
Brevity of peace 2.746*** 3.005*** 2.981*** 2.971*** 3.000*** 
N 4927 4586 4586 4586 4586 
Log likelihood -613,021 -576,380 -575,961 -575,913 -576,369 
Pseudo R2 0,096 0,095 0,095 0,095 0,095 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
NOTES: 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Italics = part of interaction term. 
 
The migration pressure indicators remain significant at a level of one percent, even 
with the inclusion of the other variables, and in respect to both sources of migration 
data. There are minimal changes in the Odds Ratio. None of the newly added variables 
reach significance, and both migration pressure and most of the control variables are 
consistently significant through all models. Neither significance nor effects seem to be 
altered to any large extent. 
 
Table 2: Conventional Conflict Logistic Regression Results, 1950-2001 (Odds Ratio) 
 
 Model Model Model Model Model 
Explanatory Variables 2.0.a 2.0.b 2.1 2.2 2.3 
Refugees_S&G 1.052*** 1.044*** 1.055*** 1.043** 1.045** 
Potential Cropland (log)  0,981 0,983 0,984 0,981 
Aid per capita  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Rural Population  0,999 1,002 0,999 0,999 
Interaction Terms       
Refugees & Rural Population    0.999*   
Refugees & Potential Cropland     0,997  
Refugee & Aid      1,000 
Control Variables       
Infant mortality rate 1.006*** 1.007*** 1.007*** 1.007*** 1.007*** 
Total Population (log) 1.214*** 1.278*** 1.281*** 1.281*** 1.279*** 
Regime 1,004 1,004 1,002 1,004 1,003 
Regime, squared 0.985*** 0.985*** 0.986*** 0.985*** 0.986*** 
Missing regime data 0.102** 0,278 0,297 0,279 0,284 
Controls for statistical dependency      
Brevity of peace 3.465*** 3.299*** 3.250*** 3.311*** 3.300*** 
N 5921 4606 4606 4606 4606 
Log likelihood -718,947 -596,700 -595,282 -596,667 -596,667 
Pseudo R2 0,088 0,088 0,090 0,088 0,088 
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NOTES: 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Italics = part of interaction term. 
 
Including interaction into these models has little implication
23
. When using the more 
recent CSP data the variables stay very much unchanged, with none of the interactions 
being even remotely significant. The migration pressure indicator remains significant 
at a one percent level throughout, and the control variables also keep their 
significance, as well as their effects. The Salehyan and Gleditsch data, being slightly 
more dated, again shows mainly the same results. The refugee variable stays 
significant throughout all models, as do the control variables. There are small changes 
in Odds Ratio and no interactions are highly significant. However, the interaction term 
of refugees and rural population is significant at ten percent, with negative effect. This 
could imply that the impact of added migration pressure on conflict potential is higher 
in countries with lower rural population, which in turn can be interpreted as countries 
with higher population density. This reasoning fits with the neo-Malthusian logic of 
population pressure‟s impact on conflict. A fixed population pressure is expected to be 
perceived relatively more intense in areas already experiencing a higher population 
density. This negative effect, however, seems to be weak. Considering the Pseudo R2, 
there is very slight reduction in the models when adding more variables no matter the 
migration data used. Although difficult to interpret substantially, comparing the 
Pseudo R2 values of the different models may be useful as the increase in value 
indicates a decrease in log likelihood, implying an improved model
24
.    
 
                                                 
23
 Although no main focus of this thesis, both conventional conflict and non-state conflict 
tested for the possible interaction between renewable resource scarcity and rural population. 
This could indicate whether resource scarcity is of greater or less importance to the risk of 
conflict in a country, relative to its size of rural populations. None of these interaction terms, 
however, proved significant.  
    
24
 Also, however difficult to interpret, given the amount of observations in the analysis the 
Prob>chi2 at least implies that the models cannot be rejected.  
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As has been shown in regards to conventional conflict; migration pressure is 
significant, unlike any of the other independent variables. The significance of the 
migration pressure impact on conventional conflict onset, could lend support to the 
perspective of conflict „contagion‟ effects, which previously has found empirical 
support (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006, Forsberg 2009). The contagion hypothesis 
associates refugee flows with destabilising spill-over effects, which indicates that host 
countries receiving refugees from countries in civil war, are more prone to conflict 
than states not receiving such refugees (Forsberg 2009b: 20). These studies connect 
refugees and conflict onset empirically, such as is done in this thesis, but to thereby 
interpret this as support for this theory, will be a little too hasty. The results of 
Salehyan and Gleditsch in their study of “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War” 
(2006), find empirical evidence suggesting that refugee flows represent a driving force 
in the diffusion of civil conflict, and that this in turn creates security concerns for host 
countries. They emphasise, however, that this constitutes no deterministic links 
between refugees and conflict, and that the majority of cases of refugee flows do not 
result in violence (ibid: 360-361).  
 
Comparing coefficients between our studies, mine have stronger effects on conflict 
onset (0.042 versus 0.051)
25
 when using the same refugee data and only control 
variables
26
. When including all other contextual variables this difference in effect is 
lost (0.042 versus 0.043)
27
  (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006: 355). Salehyan and Gleditsch 
investigate the likelihood of refugees from neighbouring countries influencing the risk 
of conventional conflict onset. The refugees accounted for are thereby those that 
migrate from areas close by. One should think, given the reasoning of their study, that 
looking at this group isolated would result in a clearer impact on conflict. The refugees 
                                                 
25
 
27
 See Appendix 7.3.  
 
26
 Given the approximate number of observations, and using the same refugee and conflict 
data, despite being difficult to interpret, the coefficients may be compared to certain, though 
limited, extent. 
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are assumed to have more interest in mobilizing in favour of a warring party when it is 
considered that this may have plausible effects in their country of origin (See also 
Wiener & Teitelbaum 2001; Lee 2001). This, however, does not seem to be the case as 
my investigation of refugees irrespective of „area-attachment‟ have similar effects on 
conflict onset, if not even stronger effects. It would be presumptuous to suggest denial 
of the “contagion effect”, but it would, perhaps, encourage further scrutiny28. 
 
 
4.2. Non-State Conflict 
It is worth remembering that the non-state data have a considerably shorter time-series 
compared to the other dependent variable, conventional conflict onset (2002-2007 
versus 1950-2007). When investigating non-state conflict, only the CSP refugee data 
are used, given its time-series. The migration pressure variable, which is strongly 
significant when it comes to conventional conflict, is insignificant concerning non-
state conflict
29
. The migration effect on non-state conflict using only control variables 
is also insignificant. This diverts from the (expected) outcomes of the conventional 
conflict models and theoretical assumptions, such as those derived from Malthus 
especially. Significance may perhaps not be reached because these data include a far 
shorter time series and, but this is difficult to determine. The potential cropland 
variable, however, indicating the population pressure on arable land, and thereby 
                                                 
28
 They present in their study significant findings with stronger coefficients, but these use the 
traditional civil war measure of 1000 battle deaths, and are therefore unsuited for comparison. 
The authors also argue that this threshold is a problematic one.  
 
29
 When using the cross-sectional design on the non-state conflict data, the refugee variable 
turns significant at a five percent level with clearly positive effects, when only including 
control variables. This is in accordance to the theoretical expectations of this thesis. This 
could suggest that the previous insignificant findings concerning non-state conflict and 
migration pressure could be a result of an insufficient time-series, rather than uncorrelated 
theory and empirical findings.  
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resource scarcity, is significant almost at the one percent level
30
. Counter-intuitively, 
this variable appears to have negative effect on non-state conflict, entailing a reduced 
risk of non-state conflict, given higher values of renewable resource scarcity
31
. These 
models cannot be rejected, given the Pseudo R2 in the test of goodness-of-fit that 
indicates an improvement in model fit when adding contextual variables
32
. 
Table 3: Non-State Conflict Logistic Regression Results, 2002-2007 (Odds Ratio) 
 
 Model Model Model Model Model 
Explanatory Variables 3.0.a 3.0.b 3.1 3.2 3.3 
Refugees_CSP 0,962 0,969 0,947 0,973 0,990 
Potential Cropland (log)  0.660** 0.652** 0.672** 0.657** 
Aid per capita  0,990 0,989 0,990 0.984* 
Rural Population  1.023* 1.024* 1.023* 1.027** 
Interaction Terms       
Refugees & Rural Population    1,003   
Refugees & Potential Cropland     0,984  
Refugee & Aid      0.996* 
Control Variables       
Infant mortality rate 1.026*** 1.019*** 1.020*** 1.020*** 1.018*** 
Total Population (log) 2.255*** 2.536*** 2.540*** 2.554*** 2.520*** 
Regime 1,023 1.069* 1.064* 1.068* 1.079* 
Regime, squared 0.985* 0.976*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 0974*** 
Missing regime data 0,302 - - - - 
Controls for statistical dependency      
Brevity of peace 4,920 4,178 3.767*** 4.098*** 3.499*** 
N 925 845 845 845 845 
Log likelihood -143,012 -122,485 -121,633 -122,380 -120,672 
Pseudo R2 0,340 0,373 0,377 0,374 0,382 
 
 
                                                 
30
 When applying GDP per capita as development indicator, the Potential Cropland variable 
remains significant, at a five percent level.  
 
31
 Due to amounts of missing, the independent variable „aid‟ was attempted excluded from the 
model. Following this the potential cropland variable loses its significance. When testing for 
interaction between the two variables, this is nonexistent. The exclusion of the aid resulted in 
an increase from 845 observations to 919.  
 
32
 The considerably higher values of Pseudo R2 compared to conventional conflict is not 
uncommon given both the time-series of the data and measure of onset versus incidence of 
conflict. 
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NOTES: 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Italics = part of interaction term. 
 
The interaction between the refugee variable and rural population is insignificant, both 
the control variables and the potential cropland variable remain significant. Although 
resulting in minimal changes in its effect on the dependent, the resource scarcity 
indicator even improves its level of significance slightly. This variable also interacts 
insignificantly with refugees. The interaction between refugees and aid is almost 
significant (0.07), but results in little change otherwise in the model. None of the 
interactions are significant, but it is interesting to note that the potential cropland 
variable remains significant through all tests. The percentage of rural population is 
either significant, or close to significant, in all models. These two variables do not 
significantly interact. The aid variable stays insignificant through all tests. The control 
variable indicating the brevity of peace continues to be significant with relatively 
strong effects.  
 
The theoretical implications of the findings of this analysis seem to question the 
presumptions of both Malthus and the relative deprivation aspects of renewable 
resource scarcity literature. Neither migration nor resource scarcity have shown 
expected effects. First of all, migration has no significant impact on conflict. Although 
the added population pressure that refugees represent have seemingly no importance 
concerning this type of conflict, the total population variable remains significant at one 
percent through all models, with positive effect
33
. This last variable could, however, 
indicate the size of a country, rather than its population density, and is thereby no 
accurate indicator. Secondly, resource scarcity indicates a reduction in the risk of 
conflict. As the Potential Cropland variable is negatively significant, one should 
                                                 
33
 This variable is also significant in relation to conventional conflict, although the Odds Ratio 
effects in these cases are positive but weak. 
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expect that the rural population indicator is complementary, and thereby has the same 
direction of results. This latter variable, however, has sporadically significant but 
positive effects on non-state conflict, entailing that high values on this variable 
indicates heightened risk of conflict.   
 
From these results one can argue that if the total population indicator indeed measures 
population density to a reasonable extent, then the considerably stronger effects this 
variable has on non-state conflict compared to conventional conflict, may assume that 
in densely populated areas, the likelihood of a strong central power is low and thereby 
suggesting low government involvement. The strong negative effect of renewable 
resource scarcity further implies that there in such areas, naturally, is no scarcity of 
land, both arable (as indicated in the Potential Cropland variable) and otherwise. 
 
 
4.3. Analysis Summary
34
 
The time-series logistic analysis of conventional conflict stays relatively unchanged, 
despite the inclusion of additional contextual factors, as well as when testing for 
interaction. The results indicate a clear significance of additional migration pressure 
(refugees) at a constant one percent level, with the approximate positive Odds Ratio 
effect of 1.04. These effects persist seemingly unaffected by additional variables and 
interaction terms. The control variables also remain significant. Diversions in the 
                                                 
34
 Tests using cross-sectional analysis have been done in an attempt to give a closer look at the 
possible relationship between the hypothesized variables. For the Salehyan and Gleditsch 
refugee data this is year 2001, and for the CSP data (in relation to both conventional and non-
state conflict) this is year 2007. The aid variable is unfortunately excluded, as the large 
amounts of missing distort the results. Non-state conflict has no significant variables or 
interaction. The migration variable is significant at a 5% level with clearly positive effect, but 
loses its significance at the inclusion of other contextual variables. When investigating 
conventional conflict, none of the independent variables are significant, except resource 
scarcity, which indicates significance at a 10% level (0.089) with strong negative effects on 
the dependant (using CSP data). There is no interaction. 
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statistical findings given the use of refugee data may either be due to the accuracy of 
observation or the somewhat different time-series, although it is difficult to distinguish 
these effects.  
 
Non-state conflict loses the significance of migration pressure, but indicates strong 
significance regarding renewable resource scarcity at an almost one percent level. The 
effects on conflict, however, are quite strongly negative. This variable remains 
significant throughout all the models. It is argued frequently that the larger the role of 
scarcities, the smaller the conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999; Suliman 1999a, b; Theisen & 
Brandsegg 2007). This is also the underlying assumption of the second hypothesis of 
this thesis, but the results of the analysis contradict these expectations, given the 
significance and negative effects of renewable resource scarcity in relation to non-state 
conflict
35
. Rural population stays interchangeably significant, or close to significant, 
with positive effect. Though there are no significant interactions, the aid and refugee 
variables almost reach a significant level (0.07), having weak negative effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Although the bar for qualifying as conflict is equally low in both types of conflict, non-state 
conflict is, as previously mentioned, does not suppose governmental involvement and thereby 
is assumed to more easily qualify as conflict.  
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5.0. Conclusion  
This analysis lends little support to the „renewable resource scarcity‟ perspective. The 
logistic time-series analysis offers support to the effects of migration pressure on the 
outbreak of conventional conflict, but does not find the same connection when 
studying non-state conflict. Here; renewable resource scarcity is found to have 
significant negative effects, while this relationship is reversed when it comes to 
conventional conflict. Non-state conflict seems to give less support to the neo-
Malthusian perspective, given that the crucial argument of population pressure fails to 
be a significant factor when measured as an added pressure by refugees.  
 
The first hypothesis assumes that “Migration pressure is particularly likely to increase 
the risk of conflict in the context of increasing renewable resource scarcity”. The 
results of the analysis indicate that added population pressure, as operationalized in 
this thesis, has significant effects on the outbreak of conflict when investigating 
conventional conflict. This variable has no effect on non-state conflict, while the 
resource scarcity indicator, however, is significant. The rejection of the first hypothesis 
is two-fold. First of all, whenever one of these effects is present, with emphasis on 
migration pressure or renewable resource scarcity, all other effects disappear, often 
with the exception of the control variables. This means that the independent variables 
fail to constitute a situation where these both have significant effects on the dependent 
variable. Although being individually important, these effects do not appear 
coincidentally and thereby invalidating the hypothesis. Secondly, despite indicating 
the significance of renewable resource scarcity, the results indicate a complete reverse 
of the hypothesis‟ assumption, as renewable resource scarcity in fact reduces the risk 
of conflict. 
 
The second hypothesis describes the types of conflict that are anticipated given its 
causes of renewable resource scarcity and migration pressure: “Violent conflict 
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resulting from the interaction between migration pressure and renewable resource 
scarcity, is of a low-intensity nature, and does not presuppose government 
involvement”. The expectations that this second hypothesis puts forth, explains the use 
of the PRIO and Uppsala conflict data and its low requirement of conflict intensity
36
. 
To fully interpret a denial or confirmation of this second hypothesis is a challenge, as 
results from the analysis are mixed, and there are not found significant findings in both 
explanatory variables (Potential Cropland and Refugees) to be able to construct the 
hypothesised context. An indication of conflict intensity, is the assumption that non-
state conflict, by not demanding government involvement, represents even smaller 
conflicts. Following this reasoning, resource scarcity should have positive effects on 
this type of conflict, but this is not the case. Renewable resource scarcity has negative 
effects implying that such context in fact reduces the chances of non-state conflict. 
This betrays the theoretical notion that the greater resource scarcity, the smaller the 
conflict. Migration has a significant and positive effect on state-based conflict. 
Although this is in line with the overall theory of this thesis, it may reject this 
particular hypothesis. One would expect a higher risk of conflict due to migration 
pressure regarding non-state conflict, but this is not the case. It is safe to say that this 
hypothesis can be rejected. Not only are there no signs of increased risk of non-state 
conflict, regarding migration pressure, renewable resource scarcity has either none or 
negative effects on this type of conflict.    
 
The third hypothesis predicts that aid has a mediating effect on conflict in the context 
of renewable resource scarcity and migration pressure. The supposed reduction in risk 
of conflict by aid does not find empirical support. Throughout the different types of 
analyses and tests run, the aid variable fails to reach significance. Neither in context, 
as supposed by the hypothesis, nor alone does this variable have significant effects. 
What this extends to indicate is not easily determined. Empirically the hypothesis is 
obviously rejected. However, that this variable remains insignificant may well be due 
                                                 
36
  A reduced limit to 25 battle-related deaths from the traditional measure of 1000.  
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to the amounts of missing. If this is the case, a positive effect should be expected (as 
the variable in the analysis is inversed), but it is impossible to predict the direction of 
effects, precisely because of its insignificance.  
 
In sum, none of the hypotheses, derived from the neo-Malthusian renewable resource 
scarcity literature, are empirically supported by the analysis conducted in this thesis. 
Methodologically, not only do the different model designs offer different results, but 
the analysis is naturally restricted by the data that is used. The time-series analysis 
seems to demonstrate effects indicating that the two different kinds of conflict 
analysed here are influenced by different factors. The onset of conventional conflict 
seems to rely positively on the additional population pressure presented by incoming 
refugees. The incidence of non-state conflict on the other hand is rather strongly 
influenced by renewable resource scarcity. Remarkably, this entails an effect quite 
opposite of what was expected, which reduces chances of conflict by increase in 
resource scarcity. The hypotheses suppose interaction mechanisms that are not present 
in any of the models, as the variables indicating renewable resource scarcity and 
migration pressure never appear significant simultaneously. The lack of clear and 
unambiguous findings does not necessarily contradict Homer-Dixon, as he expected 
the importance of environmental factors on conflict to increase with time. 
 
[…] As yet, environmental scarcity is not a major factor behind most of these 
conflicts, but we can expect it to become a more important influence in coming 
decades because of larger populations and higher per capita resource 
consumption rates (Homer-Dixon 1999: 13). 
 
This could offer a theoretical explanation for the mixed findings of this analysis, yet 
inspire future studies, as the effects of the renewable resource scarcity predicaments 
are anticipated to further develop with time and become increasingly important. My 
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findings, however, seem to contradict this statement, as for now, suggesting that 
renewable resource scarcity has no impact on conventional conflict, and is associated 
with reducing risk of non-state conflict. Further, added population pressure is relevant 
only to the outbreak of conventional conflict, while having no effects on non-state 
conflict.   
 
The findings of this particular study can arguably have been shaped by both technical 
and theoretical factors. The concepts of the resource scarcity and the neo-Malthusian 
literature are complex, and thereby perhaps not easily captured in a limited 
quantitative study such as this. Contingent arguments and intricate causal chains leave 
much to be approximated. This analysis offers a different way of operationalizing 
population pressure from the mere conventional measures of the neo-Malthusian 
assumption of population growth. The population pressure impact of refugees can be 
understood as of more acute importance to an area, relative to natural population 
growth. This allows a rather detailed measure of the pressure impact in time, which is 
important considering the accurate dating of conflict. Renewable resource scarcity is in 
the analysis understood as the relative availability of arable land, obviously excluding 
other relevant forms of renewable resources. These are, nevertheless, all necessary 
limitations. For better information about the de facto relationships between migration 
pressure, resource scarcity, and conflict, a quantitative disaggregated local-level study 
is advised. These variables fail to be more area-specific than what is defined by 
country boarders. This limits the possibility of connecting population pressure and 
local renewable resource scarcity to conflicts in smaller concrete areas and thereby 
being able to more reasonably assume that these factors are closely associated. 
However, data allowing this is limited, and the manner in which it is undertaken here 
should be considered to be a qualified first attempt. 
 
I justified my study by the use of new data, and the alternative causal connections I 
investigate by including migration, scarcity and both conventional and non-state 
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internal conflict in my analysis. The interaction of migration and resource scarcity in 
potentially causing conflict, have so far not been thoroughly investigated, which leaves 
room for the contribution of this Master‟s Thesis. As mentioned, few large-N studies 
have found strong empirical support for the relationship between resource scarcity and 
internal conflict. The results of this thesis have been able to confirm such a 
relationship, although what is remarkable is that the effect is negative, and rather 
strongly so. It is safe to say that this represents quite the opposite direction of what 
was anticipated. That renewable resource scarcity in fact reduces the risk of conflict 
not only rejects a hypothesis, but contradicts the theoretic assumption this was built 
on. Despite the Homer-Dixon „clause‟ of a scarcity-violence phenomena in 
development, and being increasingly significant, one should not expect such strong 
empirical effects suggesting the opposite, but rather expect to find what he himself has 
found in his much debated case studies (1999). Migration pressure results offer some 
support to the neo-Malthusian perspective, at least concerning conventional conflict, 
which traditionally has been the type of conflict under investigation.  
 
Despite an almost unambiguous rejection of all hypotheses, and being aware of the 
limitations of the analysis, this thesis may lend some discredit to the most grim 
predictions of resource scarcity‟s deterministic violent consequence. Migration, 
however, continues to play part in the onset of conventional conflict. These findings 
indicate that although environmental degradation, resulting in renewable resource 
scarcity, in it self may be no threat, then migration may be. This could support the 
„contagion‟ effect in reference to refugees in particular, as discussed, or have 
indications of a situation more directly related to environmental issues. Despite not 
being concerned with the reasons for flight in this study, and with emphasis on the 
great difficulties of being able to map and estimate environmental refugees, these 
refugees may, after all, be indirectly relevant to the results of this study. As 
environmental degradation, and thereby renewable resource scarcity, causes migration 
and not conflict, this could nevertheless ultimately result in internal armed conflict in 
the host area, given that migration by itself is found to be a catalyst for conflict. 
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7.0. Appendix 
7.1. Descriptive Statistics over the Dependent Variables 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
onset 7095 0.028189 0.165524 0 1 
            
NonStCon 1013 0.057256 0.232445 0 1 
 
 
7.2. Variable Correlation Matrix
37
 
  ConvC Ref AidP PotC RurPo TotPo BrevP IMR Reg RegSq RegM 
ConvC 1                     
Ref 0.0522 1                   
AidP -0.01 -0.008 1                 
PotC -0.011 -0.074 0.0197 1               
RurPo 0.0683 -0.044 0.0387 -0.201 1             
TotPo 0.0415 0.3704 -0.36 0.1263 -0.045 1           
BrevP -0.016 0.1146 0.0265 0.0378 0.2011 0.2598 1         
IMR 0.0796 -0.066 0.0438 -0.296 0.724 -0.122 0.2024 1       
Reg -0.036 0.0396 -0.06 0.069 -0.36 0.1436 -0.073 -0.533 1     
RegSq -0.085 -0.077 -0.116 0.0319 -0.369 -0.005 -0.27 -0.401 0.3123 1   
RegM -0.003 0.0205 0.1038 0.0529 -0.001 -0.028 0.0845 0.0016 -0.008 -0.165 1 
 
Conventional Conflict, 1964-2007 (CSP data) 
 
                                                 
37
 Multicollinearity is difficult to reject. A rule of thumb is that correlations between two 
variables of 0.8 or higher could indicate a problem of multicollinearity. A sign of this problem 
is that model results are very unstable, depending on the inclusion or exclusion of the highly 
correlated variables. The correlation matrix in this analysis, however, indicates no significant 
correlation. The variables that are most highly correlated are the development indicators; IMR 
and GDP, but these are never analysed simultaneously. 
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  ConvC Ref AidP PotC RurPo TotPo BrevP IMR Reg RegSq RegM 
ConvC 1                     
Ref 0.0599 1                   
AidP -0.015 0.0137 1                 
PotC -0.013 -0.003 0.0569 1               
RurPo 0.055 0.1448 -0.006 -0.238 1             
TotPo 0.0502 0.2817 -0.369 0.0863 0.004 1           
BrevP -0.015 0.1837 0.0152 0.0386 0.1715 0.2731 1         
IMR 0.0668 0.0539 -0.026 -0.306 0.7396 -0.052 0.1674 1       
Reg -0.034 -0.101 -0.052 0.0746 -0.354 0.122 -0.056 -0.533 1     
RegSq -0.073 -0.134 -0.109 0.0149 -0.289 0.0777 -0.218 -0.314 0.2616 1   
RegM -0.026 -0.099 0.2214 0.0926 -0.124 -0.288 -0.019 -0.106 0.0013 -0.319 1 
 
Conventional Conflict, 195-2001 (Salehyan & Gleditsch data) 
 
 
  ConvC Ref AidP PotC RurPo TotPo BrevP IMR Reg RegSq RegM 
ConvC 1                     
Ref 0.1263 1                   
AidP -0.053 -0.075 1                 
PotC -0.019 -0.011 -0.134 1               
RurPo 0.2028 -0.004 0.2153 -0.03 1             
TotPo 0.236 0.3907 -0.409 0.154 0.0045 1           
BrevP 0.309 0.1931 -0.028 0.0617 0.2934 0.3175 1         
IMR 0.2569 0.1883 0.2306 -0.198 0.626 -0.054 0.2976 1       
Reg -0.051 -0.081 -0.038 -0.05 -0.23 0.0545 -0.111 -0.322 1     
RegSq -0.198 -0.196 -0.309 -0.002 -0.424 0.0145 -0.281 -0.625 0.5086 1   
RegM -0.029 0.0423 0.1971 0.0887 -0.012 -0.068 -0.021 -0.062 -0.058 -0.179 1 
 
Non-State Conflict, 2002-2007 (CSP data) 
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7.3. Logistic Regression Time-Series Results in Coefficients 
Onset Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Refugees .0505199 .0154538 3.27 0.001 .020231 .0808088 
IMR .0055486 .0015862 3.50 0.000 .0024397 .0086575 
TotPopLn .1941538 .0518421 3.75 0.000 .0925451 .2957624 
Regime .0039348 .013548 0.29 0.771 -.0226188 .0304884 
RegimeSq -.0153245 .0027685 -5.54 0.000 -.0207507 -.0098983 
RegimeMiss -2.283418 1.026361 -2.22 0.026 -4.295048 -.271787 
BrevPeace 1.242742 .2998043 4.15 0.000 .6551359 1.830347 
_cons -5.231239 .5352178 -9.77 0.000 -6.280246 -4.182231 
 
 N  = 5921,  LR chi2(7) =139.40, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, Log likelihood = -718.94684, Pseudo R2 = 0.0884 
Salehyan & Gleditsch data, basic model (coefficients). Conventional conflict. 
 
 
Onset Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95%Conf. Interval] 
Refugees .0430273 .0173813 2.48 0.013 .0089606 .0770941 
Potential C. -.0192887 .0632243 -0.31 0.760 -.143206 .1046286 
Aidpercap .000323 .0028818 0.11 0.911 -.0053251 .0059711 
RurPop -.0012863 .0055138 -0.23 0.816 -.0120931 .0095205 
IMR .0073313 .0024982 2.93 0.003 .0024349 .0122278 
TotPopLn .2452529 .0682169 3.60 0.000 .1115503 .3789555 
Regime .003687 .0150751 0.24 0.807 -.0258596 .0332335 
RegimeSq -.0146209 .003015 -4.85 0.000 -.0205302 -.0087115 
RegimeMiss -1.280297 1.05535 -1.21 0.225 -3.348745 .7881513 
BrevPeace 1.19367 .3252719 3.67 0.000 .5561491 1.831192 
_cons -5.642531 .7305966 -7.72 0.000 -7.074474 -4.210588 
 
N  = 4606,  LR chi2(10) = 115.41, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, Log likelihood = -596.69987, Pseudo R2 = 0.0882 
Salehyan & Gleditsch data, all variables included (coefficients). Conventional conflict. 
 
 
7.4. “Do-File” (STATA 9 ) 
[Note: all commands yet not all run tests are shown below. This is particularly so for instance 
in relation to the alternative years checked in the cross-sectional analysis.] 
*GETTING STARTED 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamain.dta", clear 
rename countryname country 
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rename imr2 imr 
 
*UPDATING POTENTIAL CROPLAND VARIABLE  
gen temp = . 
replace temp = u_prodarea if year == 2000 
sort country year 
by country: egen temp2 = mean(u_prodarea) 
replace u_popdprod = 1000*totpop/temp2 if year > 2000 
 
*NEW VARIABLES 
*Make refugees (CSP) per capita 
gen cspref_pc=csp_host/totpop 
 
*Make refugees (Salehyan & Gleditsch) per capita 
gen s_logtotrefh_pc= s_logtotrefh/totpop 
 
*Make logtransformed CSP refugee data 
gen csp_temp=csp_host 
replace csp_temp=0.001 if csp_temp==0 
gen csp_loghost=log(csp_temp) 
 
* Make logtransformed potential cropland variable 
gen u_popdprodln= ln(u_popdprod) 
 
save "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta", replace 
********************************** CORRELATIONS ************************** 
************************ ALL VARIABLES CORRELATION MATRIX **************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(1) VARIABLE CORRELATION CSP REF. CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT  
 
corr onset csp_loghost aidpercap u_popdprodln wup_prosrur totpopln 
brevpeace imr polity politysq polmiss  
 
corr onset csp_loghost aidpercap u_popdprodln wup_prosrur totpopln 
brevpeace ksg_gdppc polity politysq polmiss 
 
 
*(2)  VARIABLE CORRELATION SALEHYAN & GLEDITSCH REF. CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT  
 
corr onset s_logtotrefh aidpercap u_popdprodln wup_prosrur totpopln 
brevpeace imr polity politysq polmiss 
 
corr onset s_logtotrefh aidpercap u_popdprodln wup_prosrur totpopln 
brevpeace ksg_gdppc polity politysq polmiss  
 
 
*(3)  VARIABLE CORRELATION CSP REF. NON-STATE CONFLICT  
 
corr nonscinc csp_loghost aidpercap u_popdprodln wup_prosrur totpopln 
brevpeace imr polity politysq polmiss  
 
corr nonscinc csp_loghost aidpercap u_popdprodln wup_prosrur totpopln 
brevpeace ksg_gdppc polity politysq polmiss  
****** MODEL CORRELATION (correlation between coefficients) ****** 
*(1) CORRELATION MODEL REFUGEE DATA (CSP)  
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logistic onset csp_loghost totpopln brevpeace imr polity politysq polmiss 
if !(onset==0 & incidence==1)  
 
logistic onset csp_loghost totpopln brevpeace ksg_gdppc polity politysq 
polmiss if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
vce, corr  
 
 
*(2) CORRELATION MODEL REFUGEE DATA (Salehyan & Gleditsch)  
  
logit onset s_logtotrefh totpopln brevpeace imr polity politysq polmiss if 
!(onset==0 & incidence==1), or  
 
logit s_logtotrefh csp_host totpopln brevpeace ksg_gdppc polity politysq 
polmiss if !(onset==0 & incidence==1), or 
 
vce, corr  
 
 
*(3) CORRELATION MODEL REFUGEE DATA, NON-STATE (CSP)  
 
logit nonscinc csp_loghost totpopln brevpeace imr polity politysq polmiss, 
or  
 
logit nonscinc csp_loghost totpopln brevpeace ksg_gdppc polity politysq 
polmiss, or 
 
vce, corr  
*********************************************************************** 
*********************************************************************** 
*********************************************************************** 
************************ BASIC MODELS ********************************* 
*(1) LOGISTIC BASIC MODEL 1.0. (conventional conflict, CSP ref data)  
 
logistic onset csp_loghost imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
*(1) LOGISTIC ALTERNATIVE MODEL  
*Contecstual variables: 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost u_popdprodln  aidpercap wup_prosrur imr totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
 
 
*(2) LOGISTIC BASIC MODEL 2.0. (conventional conflict, Salehyan and 
Gleditsch ref data)  
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
*(2) LOGISTIC ALTERNATIVE MODEL  
*Contecstual variables: 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh u_popdprodln aidpercap wup_prosrur imr totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
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*(3) LOGISTICBASIC MODEL 3.0. (non-state conflict, CSP ref data) 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss 
brevpeace  
 
*** 
 
*(3) LOGISTIC ALTERNATIVE MODEL  
*Contecstual variables: 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost u_popdprodln  aidpercap wup_prosrur imr 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace  
************************************************************************** 
************************************************************************** 
******************** MODELS WITH VARIABLES OF INTERACTION **************** 
*Run the following when appropriate: 
 
*Goodness-of-fit test (-> Pearsons Chi square not appropriate) 
lfit 
 
*Goodness-of-fit test 
lfit, group(10) table 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(1) MODEL 1.1. (refugees & share of rural population) 
*generate interaction 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen csp_loghostprosrur=csp_loghost_c*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur wup_prosrur_c imr totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur u_popdprodln aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 
& incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur wup_prosrur_c ksg_gdppc 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur u_popdprodln aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c ksg_gdppc totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if 
!(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
  
85 
 
*(1) INTERACTION MODEL 1.2. (refugees & potential cropland) 
*generate interaction 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
gen csp_loghostpopdprod=csp_loghost_c*u_popdprodln_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdprod totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdprod aidpercap 
wup_prosrur totpopln polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & 
incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdprod totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdprod aidpercap 
wup_prosrur totpopln polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace if 
!(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(1) INTERACTION MODEL 1.3. (refugees & aid) 
*generate interaction 
sum aidpercap 
gen aidpercap_c=aidpercap-27.697 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
gen csp_loghostaidpercap=csp_loghost_c*(aidpercap_c*-1) 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap wup_prosrur 
u_popdprodln totpopln polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & 
incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap wup_prosrur 
u_popdprodln totpopln polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace if 
!(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
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*(1) INTERACTION MODEL 1.4. (potential cropland & share of rural 
population) 
*generate interaction 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen prosrurpopdprod=(u_popdprodln_c*-1)*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur_c imr 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 
& incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur_c 
ksg_gdppc totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & 
incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c ksg_gdppc totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if 
!(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
************************************************************************** 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(2) INTERACTION MODEL 2.1. (refugees & share of rural population) 
*generate interaction 
sum s_logtotrefh 
gen s_logtotrefh_c=s_logtotrefh-2.708 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen s_logtotrefhprosrur=s_logtotrefh_c*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c s_logtotrefhprosrur wup_prosrur_c imr 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c s_logtotrefhprosrur u_popdprodln aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 
& incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c s_logtotrefhprosrur wup_prosrur_c ksg_gdppc 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c s_logtotrefhprosrur u_popdprodln aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c ksg_gdppc totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if 
!(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
************************************************************************* 
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clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(2) INTERACTION MODEL 2.2. (refugees & potential cropland) 
*generate interaction 
sum s_logtotrefh 
gen s_logtotrefh_c=s_logtotrefh-2.708 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
gen s_logtotrefhpopdprod=s_logtotrefh_c*u_popdprodln_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c u_popdprodln_c s_logtotrefhpopdprod totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c u_popdprodln_c s_logtotrefhpopdprod aidpercap 
wup_prosrur totpopln polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & 
incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c u_popdprodln_c s_logtotrefhpopdprod totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c u_popdprodln_c s_logtotrefhpopdprod aidpercap 
wup_prosrur totpopln polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace if 
!(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(2) INTERACTION MODEL 2.3. (refugees & aid) 
*generate interaction 
sum aidpercap 
gen aidpercap_c=aidpercap-27.697 
sum s_logtotrefh 
gen s_logtotrefh_c=s_logtotrefh-2.708 
gen s_logtotrefhaidpercap=s_logtotrefh_c*(aidpercap_c*-1) 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset s_logtotrefhaidpercap s_logtotrefh_c aidpercap_c aidpercap 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & 
incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefhaidpercap s_logtotrefh_c aidpercap_c wup_prosrur 
u_popdprodln totpopln polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & 
incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefhaidpercap s_logtotrefh_c aidpercap_c totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
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logistic onset s_logtotrefhaidpercap s_logtotrefh_c aidpercap_c wup_prosrur 
u_popdprodln totpopln polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace if 
!(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(2) INTERACTION MODEL 2.4. (potential cropland & share of rural 
population) 
*generate interaction 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen prosrurpopdprod=(u_popdprodln_c*-1)*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur_c 
imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & 
incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 
& incidence==1) 
 
*** 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur_c 
ksg_gdppc totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & 
incidence==1) 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c ksg_gdppc totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if 
!(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
************************************************************************** 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(3) INTERACTION MODEL 3.1. (refugees & share of rural population) 
*generate interaction 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen csp_loghostprosrur=csp_loghost_c*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur wup_prosrur_c imr 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur u_popdprodln aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
 
*** 
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logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur wup_prosrur_c ksg_gdppc 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur u_popdprodln aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c ksg_gdppc totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(3) INTERACTION MODEL 3.2. (refugees & potential cropland) 
*generate interaction 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
gen csp_loghostpopdens=csp_loghost_c*u_popdprodln_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdens totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace  
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdens aidpercap 
wup_prosrur totpopln polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace  
 
*** 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdens totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace  
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdens aidpercap 
wup_prosrur totpopln polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace  
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(3) INTERACTION MODEL 3.3. (refugees & aid) 
*generate interaction 
sum aidpercap 
gen aidpercap_c=aidpercap-27.697 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
gen csp_loghostaidpercap=csp_loghost_c*(aidpercap_c*-1) 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap 
wup_prosrur u_popdprodln totpopln polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace 
 
*** 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc brevpeace 
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logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap 
wup_prosrur u_popdprodln totpopln polity politysq polmiss ksg_gdppc 
brevpeace 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(3) INTERACTION MODEL 3.4. (potential cropland & share of rural 
population) 
*generate interaction 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen prosrurpopdprod=(u_popdprodln_c*-1)*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur_c 
imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
 
*** 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur_c 
ksg_gdppc totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c aidpercap 
wup_prosrur_c ksg_gdppc totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(3) INTERACTION MODEL 3.5. (potential cropland & aid) 
*generate interaction 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
sum aidpercap 
gen aidpercap_c=aidpercap-27.697 
gen popdprodaid=(u_popdprodln_c*-1)*(aidpercap_c*-1) 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost popdprodaid u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur 
aidpercap_c imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
 
************************************************************************** 
************************************************************************** 
********************** CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS ************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(1) CROSS-SECTIONAL BASIC MODEL 1.0. (conventional conflict, CSP ref data)  
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logistic onset csp_loghost imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & year==2007 
 
 
*(1) CROSS-SECTIONAL ALTERNATIVE MODEL  
*Contecstual variables (minus aid): 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost u_popdprodln wup_prosrur imr totpopln polity 
politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & year==2007 
 
 
*(2) CROSS-SECTIONAL BASIC MODEL 2.0. (conventional conflict, Salehyan and 
Gleditsch ref data)  
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & year==2001 
 
 
*(2) CROSS-SECTIONAL ALTERNATIVE MODEL  
*Contecstual variables (minus aid): 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh u_popdprodln wup_prosrur imr totpopln polity 
politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & year==2001 
 
 
*(3) CROSS-SECTIONAL BASIC MODEL 3.0. (non-state conflict, CSP ref data) 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss 
brevpeace if year==2007 
 
 
*(3) CROSS-SECTIONAL ALTERNATIVE MODEL  
*Contecstual variables (minus aid): 
 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost u_popdprodln wup_prosrur imr totpopln polity 
politysq polmiss brevpeace if year==2007 
************************************************************************** 
********************** CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERACTION  ********************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(1) CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERACTION CSP CONVENTIONAL MODEL 1.1. (refugees & 
share of rural population) 
*generate interaction 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen csp_loghostprosrur=csp_loghost_c*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur wup_prosrur_c imr totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & 
year==2007 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
92 
 
 
 
*(1) CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERACTION CSP CONVENTIONAL MODEL 1.2. (refugees & 
potential cropland) 
*generate interaction 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
gen csp_loghostpopdprod=csp_loghost_c*u_popdprodln_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdprod totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & 
year==2007 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(1) CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERACTION CSP CONVENTIONAL MODEL 1.3. (refugees & 
aid) 
*generate interaction 
sum aidpercap 
gen aidpercap_c=aidpercap-27.697 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
gen csp_loghostaidpercap=csp_loghost_c*(aidpercap_c*-1) 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & 
year==2007 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(1) CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERACTION CSP CONVENTIONAL MODEL 1.4. (potential 
cropland & share of rural population) 
*generate interaction 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen prosrurpopdprod=(u_popdprodln_c*-1)*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur_c imr 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & 
year==2003 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
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*(2) CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERACTION S&G CONVENTIONAL MODEL 2.1. (refugees & 
share of rural population) 
*generate interaction 
sum s_logtotrefh 
gen s_logtotrefh_c=s_logtotrefh-2.708 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen s_logtotrefhprosrur=s_logtotrefh_c*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c s_logtotrefhprosrur wup_prosrur_c imr 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & 
year==2001 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(2) CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERACTION S&G CONVENTIONAL MODEL 2.2. (refugees & 
potential cropland) 
*generate interaction 
sum s_logtotrefh 
gen s_logtotrefh_c=s_logtotrefh-2.708 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
gen s_logtotrefhpopdprod=s_logtotrefh_c*u_popdprodln_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c u_popdprodln_c s_logtotrefhpopdprod totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & 
year==2001 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(2) CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERACTION S&G CONVENTIONAL MODEL 2.3. (refugees & 
aid) 
*generate interaction 
sum aidpercap 
gen aidpercap_c=aidpercap-27.697 
sum s_logtotrefh 
gen s_logtotrefh_c=s_logtotrefh-2.708 
gen s_logtotrefhaidpercap=s_logtotrefh_c*(aidpercap_c*-1) 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh_c aidpercap_c s_logtotrefhaidpercap totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & 
year==2001 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
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*(2) CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERACTION S&G CONVENTIONAL MODEL 2.4. (potential 
cropland & share of rural population) 
*generate interaction 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen prosrurpopdprod=(u_popdprodln_c*-1)*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur_c 
imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & 
incidence==1) & year==2001 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(3) CROSS-SECTIONAL MODEL CSP NON-STATE 3.1. (refugees & share of rural 
population) 
*generate interaction 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen csp_loghostprosrur=csp_loghost_c*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c csp_loghostprosrur wup_prosrur_c imr 
totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if year==2007 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(3) CROSS-SECTIONAL MODEL CSP NON-STATE 3.2. (refugees & potential 
cropland) 
*generate interaction 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
gen csp_loghostpopdprod=csp_loghost_c*u_popdprodln_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c u_popdprodln_c csp_loghostpopdprod totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if year==2007 
 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(3) CROSS-SECTIONAL MODEL CSP NON-STATE 3.3. (refugees & aid) 
*generate interaction 
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sum aidpercap 
gen aidpercap_c=aidpercap-27.697 
sum csp_loghost 
gen csp_loghost_c=csp_loghost-1.655 
gen csp_loghostaidpercap=csp_loghost_c*(aidpercap_c*-1) 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost_c aidpercap_c csp_loghostaidpercap totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss imr brevpeace if year==2007 
************************************************************************** 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
 
*(3) CROSS-SECTIONAL MODEL CSP NON-STATE 3.4. (potential cropland & share 
of rural population) 
*generate interaction 
sum u_popdprodln 
gen u_popdprodln_c=u_popdprodln-4.177 
sum wup_prosrur 
gen wup_prosrur_c=wup_prosrur-55.223 
gen prosrurpopdprod=(u_popdprodln_c*-1)*wup_prosrur_c 
 
 
*model with interaction 
logistic nonscinc csp_loghost prosrurpopdprod u_popdprodln_c wup_prosrur_c 
imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if year==2007 
************************************************************************** 
************************************************************************** 
********************** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS **************************** 
sum onset if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) 
 
sum nonscinc 
************************************************************************** 
************************************************************************** 
****************************** POST 1999 ********************************* 
clear 
set mem 100m 
use "M:\MINE DOKUMENTER\MASTER\final\odamainEd.dta" 
 
*(1) LOGISTIC BASIC MODEL 1.0. (conventional conflict, CSP ref data)  
 
logistic onset csp_loghost imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & year > 1999 
 
*** 
 
*(1) LOGISTIC ALTERNATIVE MODEL  
*Contecstual variables: 
 
logistic onset csp_loghost u_popdprodln  aidpercap wup_prosrur imr totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & year > 
1999 
 
 
 
 
*(2) LOGISTIC BASIC MODEL 2.0. (conventional conflict, Salehyan and 
Gleditsch ref data)  
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logistic onset s_logtotrefh imr totpopln polity politysq polmiss brevpeace 
if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & year > 1999 
 
*** 
 
*(2) LOGISTIC ALTERNATIVE MODEL  
*Contecstual variables: 
 
logistic onset s_logtotrefh u_popdprodln aidpercap wup_prosrur imr totpopln 
polity politysq polmiss brevpeace if !(onset==0 & incidence==1) & year > 
1999 
